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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to

find that the wife was voluntarily underemployed for purposes of
determining alimony?
2)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to

impute additional income to the wife for purposes of determining
alimony?
3)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making an

award of alimony that exceeded the wife's reasonable needs after
considering the wife's actual income?
4)

Were the trial court's findings in error related to the

wife's actual income?
5)
and

Had there been a sufficient change in the wife's income

expenses

to

justify

a reduction

obligation?-

iv

in the husband's

alimony
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY
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THE HONORABLE SANDRA N. PUELLER ON AUGUST 15, 1995.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

of

this

Court

is

conferred

pursuant

provisions of §78-2A-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated

to

the

(Supp. 1993).

This action involves the Plaintiff's appeal from Findings of Fact
1

and Conclusions of Law and an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce,
entered by the Honorable Douglas J. Cornaby, on June 16, 1995, and
an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Objections to
Proposed

Findings

of Fact

and

Conclusions

of Law,

signed

and

entered by the Honorable Sandra N. Pueller, on August 15, 1995.
timely Notice of Appeal was filed on September 11, 1995.

A

No cross

appeal has been filed.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
There are no specific statutes or cases which are identifiable
as determinative authority.

As support for Appellant's position,

see statutes and cases, cited in the Table of Cases, page iii, of
this Brief, infra.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case is a domestic relations case involving the husband's
request

for relief

from alimony payments which he was making,

pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered approximately one year
earlier.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce
were signed and entered on November 23, 1993 as a result of a
settlement

agreement

reached by - the parties when the

original

matter was pre-tried before a domestic relations commissioner in
June of 1993.

That agreement was read into the record, reduced to

writing, and ultimately incorporated into the Findings, Conclusions
and Decree.
2

A material part of the parties' original settlement agreement
provided for a review of the alimony award in one year, or such
earlier time as requested by either party, based upon the wife's
claimed disability related to her thumb and her resulting inability
to work as a dental hygienist.
On February 24, 1994, the husband filed a Petition to Modify
the Decree of Divorce, requesting relief from the original alimony
award.

The wife had refused to undergo minor surgery to correct

the problem with her thumb and had failed to obtain employment at
the highest economic level possible as was agreed to under the
original Settlement Agreement and ordered by the Decree.

The wife

responded to the husband's Petition, claiming that the alimony
obligation should not be reduced.
A one day trial was held on the Petition to Modify on November
15, 1994.

It was tried before the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, the

judge assigned to handle the case for the Honorable Richard Moffat,
the judge originally assigned to the case.

At trial, both sides

were represented by counsel, both parties testified and each called
a physician to testify in support of their respective positions.
At the conclusion of the evidence, and after hearing argument
from counsel, Judge Cornaby ruled from the bench and 1) kept the
husband's alimony obligation at $4,000 per month until December 1,
1995; 2) reduced the alimony obligation from $4,000 to $3,500 per
month from December 1, 1995 to December 1, 1996, at which time it
was to be reduced by an additional $500 with that $3,000 per month

3

alimony obligation to then continue permanently; and 3) required
each side to pay their own attorney's fees and costs.
The husband then timely filed a Motion for New Trial and
Objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
submitted by the wife.

Judge Cornaby denied that Motion and an

Order to that effect was signed and entered by the Honorable Sandra
N. Pueller, (on behalf of Judge Cornaby) on August 15, 1995.
husband

timely

filed

September 11, 1995.

a Notice

of

Appeal

with

this

Court

The
on

No cross-appeal has been filed by the wife.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves the review of an initial alimony award as
provided for under a Decree of Divorce, the terms of which resulted
from a settlement agreement reached by the parties at the original
pre-trial conference held in conjunction with the original divorce
proceedings.

(R-71)

Paragraph 3 of the Decree provides as follows:

Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff
in the sum of
$4,000 a month commencing with the month of July 1993,
based upon the current financial
circumstances
of the
parties
as shown in their Financial Declarations
and
under circumstances
where defendant is currently
unable
to work based upon her present physical
disability.
There shall be an automatic review of this alimony award in
one year from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce,
or earlier
if
circumstances
warrant,
based
upon
the
anticipation
that defendant will use her best efforts
to seek
and obtain employment at the highest economic level and will,
further,
use her best efforts
to rehabilitate
herself from her
disability
to help
her
achieve
her best
employment
opportunities.
The issue
should be
children.
the right

is reserved as to whether defendant's
employment
full
or part-time
based upon the needs of the
At the time of the review, each party shall have
to express his or her respective
position
on this
4

issue, as plaintiff's
position
is that defendant should seek
and obtain full time employment and defendant;s
position
is
that she should seek and obtain part time employment due to
the children's
needs.
Plaintiff
shall have the right to request defendant to obtain
a physical
examination by a hand expert currently,
with a
further examination six months from the entry of the Decree of
Divorce and a second further examination one year from the
entry of the Decree of Divorce to assist
the Court in
determining defendant's
ability
to obtain
employment.
At the time of the review by the Court, if there has been a
substantial
change in financial
circumstances or ability,
then
the Court may make adjustments in the alimony award based upon
those changes. (R-76)
Other pertinent provisions of their agreement/the Decree,
included:
1)

The husband was to pay $2,100 per month in child

support

for the support of the parties' three minor

children, ages 15, 13 and 11. (R-77)
2)
Utah.

The wife received the marital residence in Park City,
(R-77)

3)

Both parties each received over $150,000 in cash.

(R-77)

4)

Both parties received substantial IRA retirement funds.

(R-77, 78)
5)

Each party was to pay their own attorney's fees. (R-79)

At the time of the original divorce proceedings, the parties
resided in Park City, Utah and the husband was a physician in
private practice in Salt Lake City, specializing in cardiology.
The wife was not employed but had worked extensively as a
dental hygienist in the past.

She claimed she was unable to work

in that field at the time of the settlement because a few months
earlier, she had broken her wrist and in the process injured a
5

tendon in her thumb.

This, she claimed, caused an immobility in

her hand and precluded her from pursuing her career in dental
hygienics.
In negotiating their agreement in relation to alimony, the
wife's claimed disability was specifically addressed and the wife
agreed to do her best to get back into the work force at the
highest

economic

level

possible,

as

soon

as

possible.

That

promise, on the part of the wife, was an integral and essential
part of the husband's agreement to pay the wife alimony at the
$4,000 per month level for the first one year.

It was felt that

this would give the wife enough time to have the surgery, recover
and begin earning the $3,000 to $4,000 per month which dental
hygienists regularly earn.
After the Decree was entered, the wife did not seek employment
in dental

hygienics; did not

seek

corrective

surgery

for her

hand/tendon7- and chose to work as a part-time substitute teacher
for $5.67 per hour.
Because of this inaction/action on the part of the wife and
the accompanying financial hardship placed on the husband, he filed
a Petition to Modify the original alimony award, requesting a
reduction in the award at least commensurate with what the wife was
capable of earning as a dental hygienist.
After the Petition was filed, a one day trial was held in
front of Judge Cornaby on November 15, 1994.

6

The testimony and documents presented by both parties at trial
established the following facts, all of which have substantial
bearing related to the issues raised on appeal.
Dr. Gerber is 45 years old and in good health.

He is a

cardiologist and was self employed as a private practitioner in
Salt

Lake

proceedings

City,
were

Utah.

(R-3 02)

pending,

he

While

received

the
an

original

offer

to

cardiology in Florida at a salary of $200,000 per year.

divorce
practice
(R-246)

The Financial Declaration, which he filed with the Court in the
original divorce proceedings, reflected that $200,000 per year
salary, ($16,660 per month gross) (R-57).

This was the salary on

which the original alimony and child support awards were calculated
with the specific, express understanding that his wife would do
what was necessary to improve or remedy the condition of her thumb
so that she could pursue her profession as a dental hygienist.

(R-

76)
At

the modification

hearing,

Dr. Gerber

stated

that

the

demands placed upon him by his new employer in Florida required him
to work much harder than he had in the past.

He works from 6:00

a.m. to 7:00 p.m. every weekday, and he is required to work one
night per week on call.

He also works two weekends per month, from

Friday at 7:00 a.m. to Sunday at 12:00 noon.

(R-252)

His average

work day consists of 12 to 14 hours and he regularly works over 80
hours per week.

(R-253)

Since his move to Florida, he has been

required to work harder and spend more hours, or make less money.

7

He is currently only an employee of his Florida clinic.

He is

still in the three year probationary period of his employment
contract with the clinic.

(R-336)

He has no stock ownership in

the clinic (R-278) and is not participating in the clinic's pension
plan.

(R-278)

tax bracket.

His $200,000 per year salary places him in the 34%
(R-337)

Because of the additional time he spends at work, he incurs
higher living expenses, and under his current circumstances, after
he pays taxes and his child support obligation, he has little, if
anything, to live on. (R-256; Ex P-l, P-2)

He has had to use the

savings which he was awarded in the original Decree to cover the
shortfall.
square

foot

(R-256)
house

He also used those savings to purchase a 2400
in

Florida

and

had

to

incur

additional

installment debt in order to acquire and furnish his new residence.
(R-266 and P-2)

His former wife and three children continue to

reside in the 5700 square foot house in Park City, Utah.

(R-257)

Given his current economic circumstances, he is unable to put
anything away for retirement or any monies away for the children's
college education.

(R-268)

He indicated that he simply cannot

continue to pay the $4,000 per month in alimony he originally
agreed to pay and stated that amount was intended to be temporary
and specifically conditioned upon his wife maximizing her earning
potential within a year so that the amount of alimony could be
reduced or perhaps eliminated.

Following the reaching of the

agreement, Dr. Gerber kept his part of the bargain and paid $2,100

8

per month in child support and $4,000 per month in alimony that had
been agreed upon.

(R-270)

Ms. Gerber is in her early 40's and in good health but for a
mobility probl em with her thumb.
University

(R-17)

She graduated from the

of Chicago at Loyola in 1975 with a Bachelor's of

Science in Dental Hygienics.

(R-367)

She was certified as a

dental hygienist in several states but allowed her license and
certification to lapse.

(R-369, 272)

She acknowledged that the

parties' original agreement contemplated her recertifying as a
dental hygienist.

(R-410)

Ms. Gerber did nothing to attempt to recertify, as she had
agreed to do, until after Dr. Gerber filed his Petition to Modify.
(R-4 05)
pass.

She then took the examination in June of 1994 and did not
(R-370)

She received perfect scores on the written exam,

patient presentation, and radiographic

techniques,

failed the-patient portion of the exam.
pass and received only 68 points.

(R-407) but

She needed 70 points to

(R-412, Ex. D-18)

Since then, she has voluntarily elected not to take the test
again, even though it is given at least bi-monthly at various
locations throughout the western states.

(R-405)

She testified

that she did not want to go out of state to take the exam because
it took approximately 2 days and it would be "too traumatic" for
her.

(R-4 05)

When questioned about her performance on the test,

she stated that she did very well on the polishing portion of the
exam but did not pass the scaling portion.

(R-371)

She said that

she felt the reason she could not pass the scaling portion was that
9

it had been "so long since she had done that type of work".
372, 373)

(R-

She stated that taking the test again possibly could

make a difference but said she was not capable of practicing for
the exam because
admitted

that

she

she

"did not have a license".

could

earn

substantially

more

(R-373)
as

a

She
dental

hygienist (R-3 74) and acknowledged it would amount to approximately
$200 per day.

(R-402)

She said dental hygienists in the Salt Lake

area were paid on the average of $25 per hour.

(R-402)

She described the problem with her hand as centered around
mobility and tactility.

"Tactility" means the ability to sense in

the hand, the pressure being applied to the tooth or area around
the tooth by the instrument.

She then went on to say that mobility

in her thumb was no longer a problem, inasmuch as she had been able
to compensate by adjusting the position of her hand while working
on patients, (R-374) but she still felt that there was a problem
with sensi-tivity.

Initially, she stated she did not believe an

operation to the tendon in question would help, (R-3 74) but later
admitted that such surgery help would remedy the problem.
3 75)

(R-3 74,

She said that she had voluntarily elected not to undergo the

surgery because she "did not want to be cut open again".

(R-363)

During cross examination, she changed her position and stated
that while she believed she had a physical disability in June of
1993, (R-404) she admitted that she no longer had the disability.
(R-4 03) She again acknowledged that the parties' agreement related
to alimony was tied to the problem with her thumb and her promise
to rectify the same.

(R-404)

When asked if she was going to
10

recertify as soon as possible, she did not respond.

(R-406)

She

admitted that she could get her mobility and tactility back if she
practiced and estimated that that might take several months to two
years, but said that with practice she would improve.
further

admitted

that

she did not

attempt

(R-408)

to apply

again

She
to

recertify because she has been busy with the children, (R-411) but
indicated recertification tests were given bi-monthly throughout
the intermountain area.

She further admitted that in order to

recertify, she would not have to go back to school and did not have
to get another degree.

(R-412)

She simply has to pass the test,

a test which she came within two points in passing, the one and
only time she took it.

(R-412)

On further cross examination, she

stated that she simply did not want to go back into the field of
dental hygiene.

(R-412)

During the hearing, the parties stipulated that if Ms. Gerber
could work-as a dental hygienist, she could earn
and

that

work

as

a

dental

metropolitan Salt Lake area.
that stipulation.

hygienist
(R-272-274)

was

$1,000 per week

available

in

the

The trial court accepted

(R-273)

Instead of doing what she agreed to do under the original
Agreement, Ms. Gerber took a job as a substitute teacher, working
four days per week, at $45 per day.
per hour.

(R-403)

(R-376)

This equates to $5.67

She said she was working 32 hours per week (R-

413) , and had Mondays off so that she could volunteer at the
library.

(R-387)

She said she could work Mondays if necessary.

11

(R-413) She was working four full days a week at the time of trial.
(R-4140]
From the date of the Settlement Agreement until the time of
trial, Ms. Gerber had submitted only one job application in a field
related to dental hygiene and she was informed that job had been
given to another applicant.

(Ex. D-18)

This occurred well after

Dr. Gerber filed his Petition to Modify.
Ms. Gerber then said that because of the children's extracurricular activities, she felt that she would be precluded from
working full time, but was. in fact working 32 hours per week as a
substitute teacher at the time of trial, (R-389) earning $780 per
month.

(R-377)

She testified that her needs for the $4,000 per month alimony
award and the $2,100 per month child support award had not changed
since the parties' original agreement.

(R-393)

However, at the

time of the agreement, she was earning no income and claimed that
she had monthly

expenses of

$7,017.

(R-390, Ex. D-21)

She

indicated that at the time the Petition for Modification was tried,
her monthly expenses had decreased to the sum of $5,800.
Ex. D-20)

(R-3 92,

On cross examination related to the $5,800 in expenses,

she admitted that $600 per month was allocated towards payment of
her attorney's fees; the health insurance premium of $186 was in
fact $96; and that the $200 monthly computer expenses were related
to the purchase of a computer and those payments would end in five
months.
$890.

(R-3 96)

The total of those "extra" expenses amounted to

She further admitted that she had $71,000 (R-395) in non12

retirement

investment

accounts

and

could

use

those monies

to

eliminate the $800 in monthly payments for attorney's fees and the
computer.

She

also

acknowledged

that

she

had

dividend

and

investment income of approximately $3,600 per year, or $300 per
month.

(R-401)

In December of 1992, just prior to the parties' original
settlement agreement, Ms. Gerber broke her wrist and as a result of
that fracture, she experienced a tear in a tendon, which runs along
the top of the thumb down to the wrist.

That tear was sutured and

some scar tissue developed around the torn, but repaired tendon.
The resulting scar tissue caused a restriction of mobility to Ms.
Gerber's thumb.

Both parties called physicians to testify as to

the nature of this problem and what could be done to correct it.
Dr. Larry Leonard, Dr. Gerber's expert, testified that he was
a specialist in reconstructive surgery and that his sub-specialty
was hand surgery.
specialty.

(R-344)

He devoted 9-0% of his practice to that subHe indicated that tendon repair, resulting in

restricted motion was very common (R-346) and that such restricted
mobility could be remedied by a surgery known as Tenolysis.

It is

an outpatient surgery, requiring a regional anesthetic block and
involving at best, one hour of surgery, requiring a small incision
to be made above the tendon, allowing entry into the affected area
for the purpose of cutting away the scar tissue and freeing the
tendon.

(R-348)

He indicated that there was a 90% chance of

improving the mobility and a 50% chance of returning mobility to
normal function.

(R-350)

He indicated he felt the risk of any
13

complications related to the surgery was 5%,

(R-354) and that

there would be no improvement of Ms. Gerber's condition without
surgical intervention.

(R-358) He concluded by indicating that in

his opinion, if Ms. Gerber wanted to go to work

as a dental

hygienist, she should have the surgery so that complete mobility of
her thumb could be restored.
Ms.

Gerber

called

Dr.

(R-361)
Boyd

Cole,

also

a

reconstructive

surgeon, who indicated that approximately one half of his practice
was devoted

to hand

surgery.

(R-307)

Dr. Cole said

it was

possible Ms. Gerber's condition might worsen as a result of the
tenolysis surgery, but gave no percentages other than to conclude
it was possible.

(R-313)

He acknowledged

knowing Dr. Larry

Leonard and considered him to be a good hand surgeon and a good
diagnostician.

(R-317)

He also acknowledged that the problem

could be remedied with tenolysis surgery which would be performed
on an outpatient basis.

(R-321 and 322)

Ms. Gerber's testimony about her thumb disability was at best
inconsistent and contradictory.

When questioned by her counsel,

she said she had elected not to have the surgery (R-363) . She said
she did not believe the operation would help
immediately afterwards said it might help.
examination

she

changed

her

testimony

and

(R-3 74) but then
(R-375)

said

that

On cross
she

had

compensated for the problem with her thumb and that "it was no
longer a disability".

(R-403)

She went on to state that she felt

she could get her mobility and tactility back if she practiced (R-
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4 08) but that she had concluded that she did not want to be a
dental hygienist.

(R-41)

At the conclusion of the evidence, Judge Cornaby issued his
ruling from the bench which included a finding that he felt Ms.
Gerber

could be a dental

hygienist.

(R-455-456)

Rather

than

imputing any additional income to her as a result of that finding,
Judge Cornaby found that she should continue devoting time to the
children's extra-curricular activities and that it was acceptable
for her to continue substituting teaching at $780 per month instead
of the $3,000 per month she could earn working the same amount of
time (32 hours per week) as a dental hygienist.
without

The court then,

further rationale, gave Dr. Gerber no relief

from the

$4,000 per month alimony award until December 1, 1995, at which
time the Court directed that that award would be reduced to $3,500
per month until December 1, 1996, with a further reduction of $500
per month-to $3,000 per month thereafter, permanently.

(R-449,

450)
Mr.

Gerber's

counsel

prepared

proposed

Findings

and

Conclusions and an Order which Dr. Gerber objected to and moved for
new trial.

(R-120)

Judge Cornaby overruled those objections and

denied the Motion for New Trial.

(R-149, 149 and R-176, 177)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The husband seeks the following relief in connection with his
appeal of the trial court's decision.
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1)

That the decision of the trial court, related to the

alimony awarded, be vacated.
2)

That this Court, pursuant to its equitable authority to

review the evidence and facts presented at trial, impute a proper
and

fair

amount

of

income

to

the

wife,

consistent

with

her

education and earning abilities; and reduce the husband's alimony
obligation to an amount deemed fair and appropriate by this Court.
3)

That in any event, the husband's alimony obligation be

reduced to at least $2,500 per month, effective November, 1994, the
date of trial, based upon the wife's actual income and expenses as
presented by the wife at trial.
4)

For such other and further relief as might be appropriate

and proper under the circumstances of this case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I
When a spouse is voluntarily underemployed, it is both proper
and required that the trial court impute a reasonable income to the
underemployed spouse before fixing support obligations.

This is

true in cases involving child support and alimony and is applicable
to both the paying and receiving spouse.

The facts in this case

clearly demonstrate that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily underemployed
in terms of the amount of money she could make to contribute to her
own support and the trial court erred in not so finding.

As a

result, the trial court also erred in not imputing the proper
amount

of

income

to Ms. Gerber and
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in not giving Dr.

Gerber

immediate relief from the interim alimony award agreed to by the
parties

one

and

a

half

years

earlier.

That

agreement

was

specifically premised on Ms. Gerber using her best efforts to
secure the highest paying job possible.

She failed to do that.

The trial court arbitrarily disregarded Ms. Gerber's equitable and
contractual

obligations

and

as

a

result,

treated

Dr.

Gerber

unfairly in requiring him to make the ongoing alimony payments
ordered.
Point II
The wife's own evidence demonstrated that her regular monthly
living expenses were $890 less than what she claimed and her income
from earnings and investments had increased from $0 to $1074 per
month since the entry of the Decree. This substantial and material
change

in financial

circumstances

justified at least a $1,500

reduction in husband's original $4,000 alimony obligation.

The

trial court-abused its discretion-in ignoring this evidence and not
immediately reducing husband's alimony obligation.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE
TRIAL
COURT
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION
IN
NOT
REDUCING
THE
HUSBAND'S
ALIMONY OBLIGATION
BASED
UPON THE WIFE'S
FAILURE TO FULFILL
HER OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE DECREE TO
SEEK AND OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT AT THE
HIGHEST
ECONOMIC
LEVEL
AND
HER
FAILURE TO USE HER BEST EFFORTS TO
REHABILITATE
HERSELF
FROM
HER
DISABILITY
TO HELP HER ACHIEVE HER
BEST EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES

In

domestic

relations

cases,

trial

courts

are

afforded

considerable discretion in fashioning property and support remedies
fair to both parties.

Walters v. Walters, 812 P. 2d 64

(Utah

App.1991)
A decision of a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it can be shown that the trial court abused its discretion
and acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

Walters. supra.

In this case, the trial court did not treat Dr. Gerber fairly
and the outcome which occurred was necessarily unjust to him.

He

now respectfully requests this Court to remedy that injustice so
that he too, as a litigant, will be treated fairly.
It is the prerogative of this Court to do exactly that and the
facts in this case clearly justify such action.

As was stated by

Judge Davis, in the recent case of Willey v. Willev, 287 Utah Adv.
Rep. 27, (Utah App. filed April 4, 1996).
[W]e approached
the problem
here presented
in
full
awareness
of the standard
rules
which
favor
the Findings,
Judgments
and Decrees
of
the
trial
court,
particularly
in
divorce
matters.
Not withstanding
this,
the right
of
review
on appeal
has its purposes
. . .
[This

Court] would be remiss in its
responsibility
and this assured right of appeal would be
meaningless if it unguestioningly
accepted all
actions
of the trial
court and remained
insensitive
to pleas to rectify
inequity
or
injustice.
Consequently,
the rule is
that
when it is made to appear that the court has
failed to correctly apply principles
of law or
equity . . . or that the judgment has failed
to do equity,
that it manifests a clear abuse
of discretion,
this Court on review will take
appropriate corrective action in the
interests
of justice.
(citing
Watson v. Watson, 561
P.2d 1072, 1073-74
(Utah 1977) (footnotes
omitted)
The case presently before this Court is just the type of case
about which Judge Davis was speaking.

In considering the error of

the trial court in this case, it is appropriate to review the cases
in Utah which have dealt with the issue of alimony vis a vis'
voluntary underemployment and the subsequent imputation of income
to the underemployed spouse.
In 1977, the Utah Supreme Court expressed its opinion on
alimony and-its purpose in the case of English v. English, 565 P. 2d
409

(Utah 1977) .

In English, the trial court awarded the wife

$2, 000/monthly as permanent alimony, in addition to $500 per month
in child support for the parties' two teenage daughters.

At the

time, the wife was working part time as a home economist by choice.
The wife presented evidence as to her needs which was less than the
total income she was to receive from earnings and support payments.
In reducing the alimony award from $2,000 to $1,000 per month, the
Court addressed the underlying purpose of alimony and stated:

There is a distinction
assets
accumulated
should be distributed

between the division of
during marriage,
which
upon an equitable
basis,
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and the postmaintenance.

marital

duty

of

support

and

"The purpose
of alimony
is
to
provide support for the wife and not
to inflict
punitive
damages on the
husband. Alimony is not intended as
a penalty against the husband nor a
reward to the wife. . . " (ft)
In Nace v. Nace, (ft) the court stated
that
the most important function of alimony is to
provide
support for the wife as nearly
as
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed
during marriage, and to prevent the wife from
becoming a public charge.
The court observed
that criteria
considered
in determining
a
reasonable award for support and maintenance
include the financial
conditions
and needs of
the wife, the ability
of the wife to produce a
sufficient
income for herself; and the
ability
of the husband to provide support,
(ft)
In
her
testimony
plaintiff
could
only
substantiate
a need for support in the amount
of $1,500 per month for the entire
family.
She merely thought she should receive
the
greater amounts.
Id. at 411, 412 (Footnotes
omitted; Emphasis that of the
Courts')
Said -in another way, the English Court concluded that alimony
was

intended

to

financially

assist

the

wife

in

meeting

her

reasonable expenses to the extent she was unable to do so after
using her best efforts to support herself.
Alimony has never been and should never be a vehicle

to

provide the wife with an annuity at the unjustified expense of the
husband.

Nor should an award of alimony be such that it creates on

the part of the receiving spouse, a disincentive to work to the
best of his/her abilities and ultimately become self supporting.
In making an alimony award today, a trial court is duty bound
to consider:
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1)

The financial condition and needs of the wife;

2)

The ability of the wife to produce sufficient income for
herself; and

3)

The ability of the husband to provide support. [(Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); See also Willev
v. Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993)]

In the present case, the trial court erroneously focused its
analysis entirely on the ability of the husband to pay and ignored
the remaining two required considerations and the express terms of
the parties' original agreement as was incorporated into the Decree
of Divorce.
Said in a more direct way, the underlying rationale of the
trial

court's decision was

"Dr. Gerber makes a lot of money,

therefore he can afford to pay a lot of money to his wife as
alimony."

Such an approach to an alimony analysis is wrong and not

acceptable-. This point will focus on the trial court's failure to address
Ms. Gerber's ability to produce sufficient income for herself and
the fact that given the evidence which was before the court,

a

finding should have been made that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily under
employed.

Once that finding was made, the trial court should have

then imputed income to her at the amount she acknowledged she was
capable of making.
then

determined

Once that was done, the trial court could have

what

alimony,

if

any,

was

appropriate

considering each parties' respective financial needs.
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after

The trial court's failure to accurately determine Ms. Gerber's
actual income and needs is dealt with in Point II of this Brief.
The concepts of voluntary underemployment and imputation of
income are not new to Utah domestic relations law.
In a child support setting, §78-45-7.5 (Utah Code Ann. (1953)
addresses

the

issue

of

imputation

of

income

for purposes

of

determining a person's income and states:

a)
Income may not be imputed to a parent
unless the parent stipulates
to the amount
imputed or a hearing is held and a
finding
made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed
or underemployed.
b)
If income is imputed to a parent,
the
income
shall
be based
upon
employment
potential
and probable earnincrs as
derived
from work history,
occupation
qualifications,
and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community. . .
* * *

d)
Income may not be imputed if any of the
following conditions
exist:
i)
the reasonable
costs of chid care for the
parent's minor children approach or equal the
amount of income the custodial
parent
can
earn;
ii)
a parent is- physically
or mentally disabled
to
the extent he cannot earn minimum wage;
Hi) a parent is engaged in career or
occupational
training to establish
basic job skills;
or
iv)
unusual emotional or physical needs of a child
require the custodial parent's presence in the
home.

Id. Emphasis

added.

While this statue is not di-rectly applicable to the issue
before this Court, it does provide legislative guidelines as to the
policy of Utah in relation to underemployment and imputation of
income and specifies what should be examined when considering those
issues.

Likewise, the exceptions from imputation of income set
22

forth in the statute are designed to prevent an imputation when
there is a real need which keeps a person from being employed to
his fullest capacity.
Not only are there legislative provisions providing for the
imputation of income in child support cases, but also the courts of
Utah have

recognized

and approved of

imputation

of

income

in

connection with underemployment for purposes of alimony and child
support awards in divorce actions.
In Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), the
wife, at the time of trial, was the primary caretaker of the
parties' 8 year old child and a part-time pharmacist

(before the

child's birth the wife had been a full time pharmacist).

Even

though not employed full time, the trial court found the wife's
earning capacity as a full time pharmacist to be $35,000 per year
and used that sum in determining the alimony to be awarded.

The

imputed income finding was based on evidence reflecting a mid point
of an annual gross salary range for pharmacists $31,000 to $39,000
per year in income and assumed she was employed on a full time
basis.

The Utah Court of Appeals modified the term of the alimony

award but upheld the amount of the imputation of income to the wife
as an appropriate action for the trial court to take given her
training and earning capacity.
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963

(Utah App. 1994), this Court

again approved of the trial court's imputation of income to the
underemployed spouse.
but

its

underlying

This case involved a child support dispute
principles

have
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application

to

the

case

presently before this Court.

In upholding the trial court, Judge

Greenwood, writing for the unanimous panel stated:

However, the court may impute gross income if
it has first
examined a parent's
historical
and current
earnings
to determine
that
underemployment or overemployment exists.
Id.
§78-45-7.5(5) (c) , (6) .
In this case, Mr. Hill did not stipulate
to
the amount imputed, and he argues the
trial
court did not make the required finding
that
he
is
voluntarily
unemployed
or
underemployed.
1
See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah
App. 1993) (stating that in determining
whether
to impute income due to
underemployment,
findings
must address "the critical
question
of
whether
the
drop
in
earnings
was
voluntary").
IcL at 965-966.
The issue of imputing income for purposes of alimony awards
was also addressed in Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994)
where this Court stated:

"Imputing
income
to
an
unemployed
or
underemployed spouse when setting
an alimony
award is conceptually
appropriate
as part of
the determination
of that spouse's ability
to
produce a sufficient
income." Willey, 866 P.2d
at 554.
However, a court should not impute
income for child or spousal support until
it
first determines,
"as a threshold matter,
that
income should be imputed because the [spouse]
is voluntarily
unemployed or
underemployed."
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1024. Id. at 1267.
It is important
imputation

of

income

to note that the voluntary unemployment/
concept

does not

nor

should

not

make

a

distinction between a requesting -spouse versus a paying spouse.
Rather, the analysis should focus on each spouses7
produce

sufficient

income

for

herself

[himself]

ability to

Jones

supra.

Financial assistance from the other spouse should be ordered only
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when the requesting spouse demonstrates in good faith that he/she
is not capable of completely supporting himself/herself.
The Montana Supreme Court recently addressed a case with facts
somewhat similar to the facts of this case however the genders of
the paying/receiving spouses were reversed.

In In Re Marriage of

Bukadk, 907 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1995), the wife was a physician.

The

husband remained at home and served as the homemaker and cared for
the parties' four children.

In a subsequent divorce proceeding,

the Court ultimately made an award of maintenance which the husband
on appeal claimed was inadequate and based upon gender bias.

In

rejecting that claim, the Montana Supreme Court stated:

Ed's claim of gender bias is also
unsupported.
The court awarded maintenance in the sum of
$500 per month for one year, even though it
expressed concerns that Ed had failed to take
advantage
of
educational
opportunities
throughout
his
marriage
and that
Ed's
unemployment at the time of the trial was not
wholly unintentional.
In addition,
the record
is clear that the court imputed income to Ed
not on the basis of his gender but because Ed
was capable of employment but had chosen to
forsake several opportunities
to be
available
full-time
for his children.
It is clear that
gender was not the basis for the
court's
maintenance decision.
Id at 937
Finally, in the recent case of Willey v. Willev, supra this
Court affirmed the imputation of full time income to a wife who was
working

a part

time

job

for which

there

were

not

full

time

positions available and further affirmed the trial court's implicit
finding that the wife was voluntarily underemployed.

Id. at 28

When all of the judicial/legislative pronouncements on this
issue

are

condensed

into

a

basic
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understandable

equitable

principle, that principle should be; "Each spouse should act in
good faith to maximize their respective earnings as quickly as
possible after a divorce so that the requesting party will be as
little a burden on the paying party as possible, and that the
paying party will in good faith assist the requesting party with
any real (not inflated) financial short fall."
Equity is not achieved by requiring one party to have two jobs
or work unreasonably long hours so as to enable the other party to
work part time and/or earn less than he/she is capable of earning
unless there is an extremely good justification for doing so.

No

such justification exists in this case.

A
THE WIFE, AT THE TIME OF TRIAL,
WAS
UNDEREMPLOYED AND THAT FACT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE
TRIAL
COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALIMONY
AWARD IT MADE

The evidence which was presented to the trial court required
it to make a finding that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily under employed
and the trial court abused its discretion in not so finding.
More particularly, Ms. Gerber:
1)

Was 43 years old (ExD-20)

2)

Had three (3) children, ages 15, 13 and 11 all of whom

were healthy and had no special needs.
3)

Had a degree in Dental Hygiene from the University of

Chicago. (R-367)
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4)

Worked

32

hours

per

week

at

$5.67

per

hour

as

a

substitute teacher. (R-403, 413)
5)

Could work as a Dental Hygienist for $25.00 per hour

after becoming relicensed. (R-402)
6)

Applied only once to recertify and take the test, failing

by only 2 points. (R-370, 412)
7)

Said the tests were given bi-monthly in various regional

locations but did not want to take it again because it was "too
traumatic". (R-405, 411)
8)

Said she was no longer disabled. (R-403)

9)

Applied for only one other job in the field of dental

hygiene, and that was after Dr. Gerber's Petition to modify was
filed. (R-375)
10)

Acknowledged that jobs were available in the field of

dental hygiene. (R-274)
11)

Agreed that she could make $3,000 to $4,000 per month

working 32 to 40 hours per week as a dental hygienist.
12)

Said she now had concluded that she did not want to be a

dental hygienist.
13)

(R-402)

(R-412)

Acknowledged that the original Settlement Agreement was

premised upon her returning to the field of dental hygiene after
she had time to correct the problem with her thumb.
14)

(R-410)

Said she did not know want to have the minor surgery to

correct the mobility problem with her thumb. (R-3 63)
In spite of all of this undisputed evidence, the trial court
simply missed the point and focused not on the fact that this
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trained and college educated woman was, by choice, earning a little
more than minimum wage, but rather on the extra curricular time she
claimed she needed to spend with the children transporting them to
and from their non-school activities.
Even taking those activities into account, the court found
that her working 32 hours per week still allowed her to do what she
said

she

had

to

do

in

extracurricular activities.

connection

with

the

children's

(paragraph 16, Findings, R-156, 157)

It is clear that the trial court misunderstood the concept of
"voluntary underemployment" and considered only one of the two
criteria which must be looked at, (i.e., 1) the amount of time an
individual can work and, 2) the amount of money an individual can
earn given that individual's qualifications and job availability.)
It was latter criteria that the trial court simply ignored and
which should have been considered in depth, especially in light of
the parties' earlier agreement upon which the initial
payment was based.

alimony

Ms. Gerber had agreed to use her best efforts

to maximize her earning potential

so that the heavy

financial

burden on Dr. Gerber of the initial alimony award could be reduced
as soon as possible.
The evidence before the trial court unequivocally showed that
Ms. Gerber had not kept her part of the original bargain and that
would be acceptable so long as Dr. Gerber is not unfairly penalized
because of Ms. Gerber's voluntary decisions regarding what she
wants to do; what she wants to be paid; and what number of hours
she wants to work.
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B
THE
TRIAL
COURT
ERRED
IN
NOT
IMPUTING ADDITIONAL
INCOME TO THE
WIFE FOR PURPOSES
OF
DETERMINING
WHAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE
ALIMONY
AWARD UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE

It was incorrect for the trial court not to make a specific
finding that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily underemployed.
demonstrated that she was.

It has been

Once a determination of voluntary

underemployment is made, the trial court is required to impute an
appropriate amount of income to the underemployed spouse before so
that the proper incomes of both of the parties can be considered in
connection with the alimony analysis.
By not imputing income to Ms. Gerber, as was supported by the
evidence,

the

trial

court's

decision

regarding

alimony

was

erroneous, patently unfair to Dr. Gerber and fatally defective.
The parties stipulated that a dental hygienist could earn $25
per hour or $3,000 to $4,000 per month working a 32 to 40 hour
week.

(R-272)

They also stipulated that work in the field of

dental hygiene was available in Salt Lake and the general Wasatch
Front area.

(R-274).

Ms. Gerber said she was no longer disabled

so as to preclude her from working as a dental hygienist even
without the surgery which Dr. Leonard had recommended (R-4 03).

Ms.

Gerber said the only thing preventing her from so working was the
lack of a license which could be secured upon her
completion of the recertif ication test

successful

(R-373) , a test she took

only once and failed by only two points; (R-412) a test which is
given throughout the intermountain region every two months; (R-411)
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a test she said she did not want to take again; (R-412) a test she
felt she could pass if she only practiced a little.

(R-373)

Ms. Gerber's position of not doing what was necessary to
maximize her earning potential, while demanding that the $4,000 per
month alimony payments continue, placed an unjust financial burden
on Dr. Gerber and left him with no alternative other than to
request the Court to impute income to Ms. Gerber and reduce his
alimony obligation commensurately.

Dr. Gerber asked Judge Cornaby

to give him some financial relief and the Judge

unjustifiably

refused to do so in spite of substantial uncontradicted evidence
demonstrating that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily underemployed and
capable of earning $3,000 - $4,000 per month if she had really
wanted to.
Based upon the evidence in the record and the authority of
this Court to not only review but make its own factual findings
from the evidence in the record, -Dr. Gerber would request that the
trial court's findings be modified so as to impute income to Ms.
Gerber in the amount of at least $3,000 per month and that the
alimony determination made by the trial be reduced accordingly.

POINT II
THE
TRIAL
COURT
ERRED
IN
NOT
REDUCING
THE
HUSBAND'S
MONTHLY
ALIMONY
OBLIGATION
BY
AT
LEAST
$1,363.00
PER MONTH - THE AMOUNT
WHICH THE WIFE'S NET MONTHLY INCOME
EXCEEDED HER NET MONTHLY EXPENSES

Assuming only for the sake of argument that Ms. Gerber was not
voluntarily underemployed and should not have additional income
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imputed to her, the trial court still committed reversible error by
ignoring undisputed income and expense evidence which justified a
reduction of the husband's alimony obligation by at least $1,363
per month.
The following facts were undisputed:
1)

Dr. Gerber's monthly income was the same both at the time

of the Decree and the modification hearing. (R-246, Ex D-10)
2)

Ms. Gerber's monthly income at the time of the Decree was

$6,100 per month ($4,000/month alimony and $2,100 per month child
support).

(Ex D-21)

3)

Ms. Gerber's monthly expenses at the time of the Decree

were $7,017.
4)

(Ex D-21)

At the time of the modification hearing, Ms. Gerber's

monthly

income had increased

to $7,180

[alimony $4,000; child

support $2,100; earnings from teaching $774 (R-377); earnings from
investments-$300]. (R-401)
5)

At the time of the modification hearing, Ms. Gerber's

monthly expenses were $5,817
admitted

that

(Ex D-21)

In addition, she also

$890 of those monthly expenses were not

regular monthly expenses.

really

(i.e. the $186 in health insurance was

really only $96; the $200 per month in computer expenses had only
5 payments left; and the $600 per month in attorney's fees) (R396).

She had over $71,000 in savings which could be used to pay

off these bills if necessary.
accurately

calculate

and

(R-397)

consider

31

The trial court failed to

what

financial

change

had

actually occurred.

If it had done so, the following would have

immediately become apparent:

Ms. Gerber7s Monthly Income And Expense Comparison

Alimony
Child Support
Wages
Investment Income
Total

Income/Date
of Decree

Income/Date
of Modification

$4000
2100
0
0
$6100

$4000
2100
700
300
$7180

Monthly Expenses
Date of Decree

Monthly Expenses
Date of Modification

$7017

$5817
Less :
1) Overstated
health insurance
premiums

( 961

2) Attorney's fee
payment

(600)
(200)
(890)

3) Computer payment
Wife's adjusted monthly
expenses date of
modification

Difference
Difference

between income and expenses without
$7,180 minus $5,817 = $1,363 excess
between income and expenses
$7,174 minus $4,912 = $2,260

$4921

adjustment

with
adjustment
excess

This undisputed evidence demonstrates that at the time of the
modification Ms. Gerber was receiving at least $1,363 more per
month

in

income

than was needed

to meet

expenses she claimed she was incurring.
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the

regular

monthly

When that occurs, the

trial court is obligated to make an alimony award that does not
exceed Ms. Berger's actual net needs, Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P. 2d
1065, (Utah App. 1994)
In this case, Ms. Gerber's evidence demonstrated that she did
not have the financial needs to justify continuation of the $4,000
per month alimony award and the trial court simply elected to
ignore that evidence in denying husband's request to immediately
reduce

the

monthly

award

by

at

least

$1,000.

Such

action

constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
This error is further amplified and becomes more egregious
when considered in conjunction with the fact that Ms. Gerber was
underemployed and could have been earning $24,000 to $36,000 per
year instead of the $8,400 she was earning as a substitute teacher.
Further, the trial court's own findings on the issue of Ms.
Gerber's

income

and

expenses

are

clearly

erroneous

supported by the evidence presented.

Findings

of Fact

6.
The Defendant submitted a Financial
Declaration
in June of 1993, stating
she had
no income and filed a Financial Declaration
in
August of 1994, declaring an income of $244.41
per month from substitute
teaching.
This, she
testified,
had increased to $300.00 per month
at the time of
trial.
7.
In
claimed living
for herself
parties.
In
claimed living
for herself
reservations
expenditures.

June of 1993 the
Plaintiff
expenses of $7,011.00 per month
and the minor children
of the
August of 1994, the Defendant
expenses of $5,817.00 per month
and the minor children
with
of several anticipated
capital
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and

not

8.
The court
finds
no
substantial
change
in
the
financial
status
or
circumstances
of the Defendant between
the
time of the agreement of the parties
and the
entry of the Decree of Divorce and the
trial
of this matter on November 15, 1994. (R-153,
154)
Finding of Fact
Declaration

6 is simply wrong.

dated August

9,

1994

Defendant's Financial

(Ex D-20)

stated

she

earned

$244.41 per month working part time. At trial, Defendant testified
she was making $5.67 per hour and working 32 hours per week.

(R-

402), which she said equated to $700 per month in income, not the
$300 per month found by the trial court.
Likewise, Finding of Fact 8 is clearly erroneous regarding its
conclusion that a $474 per month increase in income and $1,200 per
month reduction in monthly living expenses were not a material
change in circumstances justifying significant
alimony award then in effect.
can

a

conclusion

be

relief

from the

Under no stretch of the imagination

reached

£hat

this

change

in

financial

circumstances was not substantial enough to justify an immediate
and significant reduction in Dr. Gerber's alimony obligation.
It was inequitable and arbitrary for the trial court not to
have immediately reduced husband's alimony obligation to wife by at
least $1,363 per month, based upon Ms. Gerber's own evidence and
testimony.

CONCLUSION
In today's world, divorce is an unfortunate reality that
necessarily carries with it adverse financial ramifications to the
34

individuals involved.

Both parties have responsibilities towards

one another to act in good faith in an attempt to reduce, as much
as possible, the financial impact concomitant with a termination of
their marriage.
In this case, Dr. Gerber fulfilled the responsibilities he
agreed to undertake when the parties settled their case one and one
half years earlier.

He paid the support monies agreed to and had

to work 8 0 hour weeks in order to do so.
On

the

other

hand,

Mrs.

Gerber

did

not

fulfill

her

responsibilities to use her best efforts to minimize the financial
impact of this divorce and did not keep her part of the bargain
which required her to use her best efforts to secure the highest
paying job possible.

What she may want to do with her life in

terms of her future employment is basically up to her.

But when

she voluntarily makes a decision to not work to full capacity, Dr.
Gerber should not be required to-continue to contribute monies in
order to make up the differences created by her decision to pursue
other less financially rewarding endeavors.
The job of the trial court was to do equity based upon the
evidence presented.

That evidence undeniably and unequivocally

demonstrated that Ms. Gerber did not do what she had earlier agreed
to do under the parties' original agreement.

The trial court

arbitrarily chose to ignore that fact and in so doing failed to
give Dr. Gerber the financial relief he was entitled to receive.
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It is the job of this Court to rectify this

substantial

inequity and miscarriage of justice and Dr. Gerber respectfully
requests this Court to do so.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of May, 1996.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

Bv:

/ L^"* ~\.
Kefit M. Kastin|j, of Counsel
Attorney for Plaintiff/AppeTlant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a representative of Dart, Adamson & Donovan,
hereby certifies that two (2) true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Brief of Appellant to David S. Dolowitz, dated
May 20, 1996, was hand delivered to the following counsel of
record:
David S. Dolowitz, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Kent M. Kasting, co-counseJ
for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOOOooo
LOWELL GERBER,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
v.
Civil No. 924905415DA

MARY JO GERBER,

Hon. Richard H. Moffat
Hon. Michael S. Evans

Defendant.
oooOOOooo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for pretrial
on the 23rd day of June, 1993, before Michael S. Evans, plaintiff
appearing in person and by his attorney B. L. Dart, and defendant
appearing in person and by her attorney David S. Dolowitz, and the
parties having

reached

a stipulation

settling

all

outstanding

issues in this divorce action, and the parties having stipulated
that each of the parties could be awarded a divorce one from the
other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the Court
having considered the terms of the stipulation and finding them
reasonable and the Court having made and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Each of the parties is entitled to and is hereby

awarded a Decree of Divorce one from the other on the grounds of

r-

r\

r

«r% '**

i

ft f. ft ', • j <-'

irreconcilable

differences,

which

Decree

shall

be

final

upon

signing and entry.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant have three children as issue

of this marriage, to wit: Rebecca, age 13; David, age 11 and
Jonathan, age 9.

Defendant is awarded the permanent care, custody

and control of these children, subject to plaintiff's rights of
visitation as follows:
a.

One half of summer vacation, including

the

right to have any one or two children for a separate one-week
period as part of his half summer with each child.
provide defendant with at

Plaintiff shall

least two months notice of when he

chooses to exercise his summer visitation.
b.

Plaintiff

shall have the right to have the

children for one-half the Christmas break, with Christmas Eve and
Christmas Day being alternated between plaintiff and defendant.
Plaintiff shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas
Day

and

half

the

Christmas

break

in

even-numbered

years

and

defendant shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas
Day in odd-numbered years.
c.

Plaintiff shall have the right to visit with

the children anytime he is in Utah upon providing to plaintiff as
much advance notice as he has of his trip to Utah.

In the event

the notice is less than 24 hours, plaintiff would respect any other
scheduled activities the children have.
d.

One half of holidays, to be alternated between

e.

A weekend for each child within the week or two

the parties.

of that child's birthday.

3.

Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the

sum of $4,000 a month commencing with the month of July, 1993,
based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties as
shown in their Financial Declarations and under circumstances where
defendant

is currently

unable to work

based

upon her

present

physical disability.
There shall be an automatic review of this alimony
award in one year from the date of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce,

or

earlier

if

circumstances

warrant,

based

upon

the

anticipation that defendant will use her best efforts to seek and
obtain employment at the highest economic level and will, further,
use her best efforts to rehabilitate herself from her disability to
help her achieve her best employment opportunities.
The issue is reserved as to whether

defendant's

employment should be full or part-time based upon the needs of the
children.

At the time of the review, each party shall have the

right to express his or her respective possition on this issue, as
plaintiff's position is that defendant should seek and obtain fulltime employment and defendant's position is that she should seek
and obtain part-time employment due to the children's needs.
Plaintiff shall have the right to request defendant
to obtain a physical examination by a hand expert currently, with
a further examination six months from the entry of the Decree of
Divorce and a second further examination one year from the entry of
the

Decree

of

Divorce

to

assist

the

Court

in

determining

defendant's ability to obtain employment.

3
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At the time of the review by the Court, if there has
been a substantial change in financial circumstances or ability,
then the Court may make adjustments in the alimony award based upon
those changes.
4.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to plaintiff as child

support for the three minor children of the parties the sum of
$2,100

per

month

Plaintiff

is

insurance

and

commencing

further

with

the

month

ordered

to

provide

be responsible

for

one-half

of

health
of

July,
and

all

1993.

accident

non-insured

medical, dental and orthodontia and reasonable counseling expenses
which may be incurred for the children.

Plaintiff is also ordered

to be responsible for one-half of work related day care expenses
incurred by defendant in her employment.
Defendant shall be entitled to have the children as
her exemptions for tax purposes.
At such time as there is a reduction from three
children to two minor children at home, plaintiff1s

obligation

shall automatically be reduced to $1,400 a month for two minor
children and $825 a month for one minor child.
5.

The property of the parties shall be divided as

follows:
Mary Jo

Lowell

$176,000

Park City home equity

10,000

Bear Lake lot
New Orleans condo

10,000

Household furniture

14,334

A-A

5,940

t" 0 0 »» , '

Vehicles:
1993 Ford Aerostar
1992 Mitsubishi Diamante
1983 Porsche

20,000
22,000
-0-

Merrill Lynch accounts:
CMA #587-29077 $197,171 (9/24/93) 139,814

57,357

WCMA #330-97271 (9/30/93)

77,259

IRA #587-83743 (9/24/93)

21,579

IRA #584-83744 $300,770 (9/24/93)

106,385

194,385

First Security accounts:
MMA
MMA
MMA
MMA
IRA
IRA
IRA
IRA

#18101217 (8/31/93)
#18101203 (8/31/93)
#217-80465-17 (9/30/93)
#217-80803-16 (9/30/93)
#600030024692514 (w)
#600310024665916 (w)
#60003002466114
(h) (9/30/93)
#600310024692417 (h) (9/30/93)

31,871
853
2,708
4,870
632
8,563
34,282
8,653

Other accounts/stocks:
Keystone Account (8/31/93)
North Carolina NG
GTE
Paine Olsen #503431
Merit Medical stock
Wilmac Partnership T0864

1/2
1/2
11,250
1/2

5,585
1/2
1/2
1/2
44,958

Insurance Policies:

T r a v e l l e r s # 0 7 3 3 4 7 - 2 2 6 9 3 2 00 (8/31/93)
(8/31/93
Minnesota #1-781-6363

5,257
2,284
6,013
-0-

#1-782-958
Beneficial #BL1083753

9,404

Lowell Gerber, P.C.
1/2

Medical receivables

1/2
(8,000

Idaho Falls Antitrust Suit
Park City Doctors Suit

$512,118

TOTAL VALUES

$512,118

5
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6.

Each party is ordered to be responsible for the

payment of his or her own attorney's fees and costs.
7.

Each party is ordered to execute any documents and

perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree
of Divorce when it is entered.
DATED this 13

day of

|\/ro-tvAX^-\ ,

1993.

BY THE COURT:

N&M
HON. MICHAEL S. EVANS
Commissioner
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

C

K/

1^-^^^^
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ

/

Attorney for Defendant
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B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
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oooOOOooo
LOWELL GERBER,
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION

Plaintiff,
v.
MARY JO GERBER,
Defendant.

:
:

Civil No. 924905415DA
Judge Richard H. Moffat

oooOOOooo
Plaintiff represents to the Court and alleges as follows:
1.

The parties were previously married to each other

and at a pretrial hearing held in June, 1993, entered into a
settlement agreement which was finally

incorporated

into the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
entered in this case on November 26, 1993.
2.

Under the terms of the Findings of Fact and Decree

of Divorce defendant was awarded alimony from plaintiff in the sum
of $4,000 a month, commencing with the month of July, 1993, based
upon the then current financial circumstances of the parties as
shown in their financial declarations and under circumstances where
defendant was currently unable to work based upon her physical
disability.

K-y

e^°r';;

3.

The Findings of Fact provided that,
"There should be an automatic review of this
alimony award in one year from the date of the
entry of the Decree of Divorce or, earlier if
circumstances warrant, based upon the anticipation
that defendant will use her best efforts to seek
and obtain employment at the highest economic
level and will further use her best efforts to
rehabilitate herself from her disability to help
her achieve her best employment opportunities."

4.
further

Under the terms of the Findings and Decree it

provided

specialist,

Dr.

for
Larry

an

examination

Leonard,

of

by

an

orthopedic

defendants

hand.

hand
That

examination has now occurred and a report letter has been received
from

Dr.

Leonard.

In

addition,

Dr.

Leonard

has

provided

supplemental information by telephone.
5.

Defendant's physical disability is created by a

tendon which is locked down by scar tissue which does not allow
defendant to fold her thumb into her hand.
freed by - a

This tendon can be

simple operation under local anesthetic with the

expected result that the hand will be much more functional which
will assist defendant in both her household activities and in her
employment endeavors. Without the hand surgery the condition will
not be corrected.
6.

Defendant informed Dr. Leonard that she does not

intend to have the surgery to correct the tendon condition and it
is plaintiff's further understated that she has stated that she has
no intention of going to work and does not want to have her hand
fixed because she would then have to go to work and, therefore,
does not want the surgery to fix the hand.

7.

Defendant's

actions

constitute

a

voluntary

continuation of her disability condition which are the basis for
the review

of the alimony

award

at this time

in

light of

defendant's failure and refusal to meet the terms of the Findings
and Decree as stipulated to in June of 1993.
8.

As a further entitlement for review, plaintiff

asserts that his income is not providing sufficient income to meet
his current living expenses. He currently receives a net take-home
check each half month of $4,700, a total of $9,400 a month.

From

this he is required to pay defendant alimony and child support in
the amount of $6,100.

In addition, he is required to pay his

disability insurance which was his understanding would be covered
by the clinic by which he is employed.

This understanding was in

error and plaintiff is having to pay this premium out of his own
salary at a cost of $800 a month.
a month

is not

sufficient

The remaining amount of $2,300

to meet plaintiff's

needs

in an

appropriate fashion.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1.

For a modification of the alimony award terminating

defendant's entitlement to alimony based upon defendant's failure
to comply with the terms of the Decree of Divorce and the
circumstances which have changed since the entry of the Decree of
Divorce.
2.

For plaintiff's attorney's fees in bringing this

proceeding.
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3,

For

such

other

relief

as

the

Court

deems

appropriate.
DATED this ^j

day of February, 1994.

,S*

^
B. L. DART
MAILING CERTIFICATE
» />

I hereby certify that on the Jj-\

day of February, 1994,

I mailed a copy of the foregoing to:
David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Defendant
525 East 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo
LOWELL GERBER,
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION AND REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

MARY JO GERBER,

Judge:

924905415DA

Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.
oooOOOooo
Defendant, Mary Jo Gerber# answers Plaintiff's Petition
for Modific-ation as follows:

FIRST

DEFENSE

The Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted in that it states no circumstances which Plaintiff did
not claim existed at the time this matter came on for trial and
therefore presents no substantial change in circumstances.
SECOND DEFENSE

1.

Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraphs 1, 2,

and 3 of Plaintiff's Petition.
2.

Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph 4 of

Plaintiff's Petition wherein Defendant has undergone an examination

\

X .

ftfto r- r, i

of Dr. L. Leonard, but has no knowledge of the alleged supplemental
telephone information provided by Dr. Leonard and therefore denies
said allegation.
3.

Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraphs 5, 6

and 7 of Plaintiff's Petition.
4.

Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 8 of

Plaintiff's

Petition

since

she

is

without

knowledge

of

his

assertion and no verifying documentation has been submitted.
THIRD DEFENSE AND CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S

FEES AND COSTS

This action is not pursued by the Plaintiff in good faith
in that there has been no substantial change in his financial
situation from that which he asserted at the time of the pretrial
settlement conference when he agreed to the terms and conditions of
the

Decree

of

opportunities
Divorce.

Divorce.
and

-- In

Defendant

complying
addition,

with
as

the

there

is

pursuing

terms
has

of

been

employment

the

Decree

of

no

change

of

circumstances justifying a modification of the decree of divorce
this court should require the Plaintiff to pay all court costs and
attorney's fees incurred in this matter.
WHEREFORE, Defendant request Plaintiff take nothing by
this action and pay all court costs and attorney's fees incurred by
the Defendant and for such further and other relief as the court
deems just and appropriate.when advised in the premises.
DATED this J~—

day of March, 1994.

O-t-xz*^
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Defendant

B. L. DART (818)
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Attorney for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOOOooo
LOWELL GERBER,

:

Plaintiff,

OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

:

v.

:

MARY JO GERBER,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. 924905415DA

:

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

oooOOOooo
Plaintiff, Lowell Gerber, specifically objects to the
defendant's proposed Findings of Fact as being inconsistent with
the evidence in this case or the ruling made by the Court at the
time of the Jbrial as follows:
1.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 4 of the Findings of

Fact for the reason that states that plaintiff's expenses have not
increased and were not being fully expended.
plaintiff's
increased

Exhibit
by

2,

showing

approximately

that

$2,000,

This is contrary to

plaintiff's
including

expenses
expenses

had
for

disability insurance and for installment debts for purchase of
furniture and furnishings in order to establish a new home.

As

such, the finding is an incorrect statement of the evidence at
trial.

X-i^
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2.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 5 of the Findings of

Fact in that said paragraph relies upon the finding in paragraph 4
of the Findings of Fact and for the same reason it is objected to.
3.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 8 of the Findings of

Fact in its conclusion that no substantial change in the financial
circumstances of the defendant have occurred.

This is directly

contrary to the finding in paragraph 7 of the proposed Findings of
Fact that defendant's expenses have reduced by at least $1,000
since the time of trial from $7,017 to $5,817 a month.

Fact

for

4.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 9 of the Findings of

the

reasons

set

forth

in

the

next

three

foregoing

paragraphs which demonstrate that there has, in fact, been a change
in financial circumstances of the plaintiff.
5.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 11 of the Findings of

Fact as it sets forth a theory of contract not raised by defendant
at trial or in the original settlement of this case.

This case was

settled on the basis that defendant was disabled and that her
income capacity would be reviewed within one year.
6.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 16 of the Findings of

Fact which sets forth a rationale approving defendant's current
part-time

employment

as

a

substitute

teacher

which

was

not

expressed by the Court in its ruling and is not consistent with the
evidence.

The

evidence

was

that

part-time

dental

hygienist

employment is available and at the rates available to dental

A-H
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hygienists this would provide to defendant working part-time an
income of $2,000 a month.

There was no testimony that part-time

employment as a dental hygienist would not be consistent with the
schooling situation of the children.
7.

Defendant objects to Findings of Fact paragraph 18

for the reasons set forth in paragraph 6 above and for the further
reason

that

it

is inconsistent

with

the Court's

finding

that

defendant is not employable as a dental hygienist because of her
problems with "tactility", which don't allow her to pass the test
for dental hygienists.

Defendant's testimony was that it is not

possible to gain this tactility as she cannot work on patients and
there isn't a training situation available to allow her to gain
tactility.

The paragraph

is further objected

to as the

last

sentence is incomprehensible.
8.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 2 of the Conclusions

of Law as being inconsistent with the ruling of the trial court.
The trial court found that based upon the current needs of the
children defendant should not have to work more than part-time at
the present time. The Court further found that defendant could not
work as a dental hygienist as she is unable to pass the licensing
test due to lack of tactility and, as such, she is doing all that
she can.

There is no support either in the testimony or in the

ruling of the Court that defendant, if she were licensed as a
dental hygienist, could not work part-time and still meets the

3
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needs of the children earning a substantially higher income than
she currently earns.
DATED this 24th day of Aptfj/,

/1995, /

B. L. DART
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of April, 1995,
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to:
David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Defendant
525 East 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
LOWELL GERBER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

Civil No. 924905415DA

MARY JO GERBER,

Judge: Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.
—oooOOOooo—

The above-entitled matter came before the court on November 15, 1994,
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding for trial of the Plaintiffs Petition to Modify
the Decree of Divorce. The Plaintiff was present in person, and represented by counsel,
B. L. Dart. The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S.
Dolowitz. The court heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses, produced by
each of the parties, received into evidence exhibits offered by the parties and being
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following as its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered November

x_n

23, 1993. The Decree was based upon a Stipulation of the parties made in open court.
2.

Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and paragraph 3 of the Decree

of Divorce effecting the agreement of the parties were entered on November 23, 1993.
They provide:
"Defendant should be awarded alimony from the
Plaintiff in the sum of $4,000.00 per month commencing with
the month of July, 1993, based upon the current financial
circumstances of the parties as shown in their Financial
Declarations and under circumstances where Defendant is
currently unable to work based upon her present physical
disability.
There should be an automatic review of this alimony
award in one (1) year from the date of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce, or earlier if circumstances warrant, based
upon the anticipation that Defendant will use her best efforts
to seek and obtain employment at the highest economic
level, and will further use her best efforts to rehabilitate
herself from her disability to help her achieve her best
employment opportunity.
The issue is reserved as to whether Defendant's
employment should be full or part-time based upon the needs
of the children. At the time of the review, each party should
have the right to express his or her respective position on
this issue, as Plaintiffs position is that Defendant should seek
and obtain full time employment and Defendant's position is
that she should seek and obtain part-time employment due
to the children's needs.
Plaintiff should have the right to require Defendant to
obtain a physical examination by a hand expert, currently,
with a further examination six (6) months from the entry of
the Decree of Divorce, and a second further examination one
year from entry of Decree of Divorce to assist the court in
determining the Defendant's ability to obtain employment.
At the time of the review by the court, if there has
been a substantial change in the financial circumstances or
ability, then the court may make adjustments in the alimony
2
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award based on those changes."
3.

The Plaintiff in his Financial Declaration of June of 1993 declared

he had an income of $16,666.67 per month. In his Financial Declaration of August,
1994, he declared income of $16,669.23 per month.
4.

At the time the Plaintiff submitted his Financial Declaration in June

of 1993, he had already moved from Utah to Florida, established a residence, entered
into practice and declared monthly living expenses of $6,344.00 per month. At the time
he filed his August, 1994 Financial Declaration, the Plaintiff claimed living expenses of
$6,370.00 per month, which when tested in cross-examination, he admitted he was not
fully expending.
5.

Considering the Financial Declaration submitted by the Plaintiff in

June of 1993, upon which the settlement of the matters reached by the parties were
made and that submitted in August of 1994, as well as his testimony of November 15,
1994, the court finds no substantial change in the financial status or circumstances of
the Plaintiff between the date of the agreement of the parties, the entry of the Decree
of Divorce and the trial of this matter on November 15, 1994.
6.

The Defendant submitted a Financial Declaration in June of 1993,

stating she had no income and filed a Financial Declaration in August of 1994, declaring
an income of $244.41 per month from substitute teaching. This, she testified, had
increased to $300.00 per month at the time of trial.
7.

In June of 1993 the Plaintiff claimed living expenses of $7,017.00 per

month for herself and the minor children of the parties.

In August of 1994, the

3
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Defendant claimed living expenses of $5,817.00 per month for herself and the minor
children with reservations of several anticipated capital expenditures.
8.

The court finds no substantial change in the financial status or

circumstances of the Defendant between the time of the agreement of the parties and
the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the trial of this matter on November 15, 1994.
9.

The court determines that there was and has been no substantial

change in the financial circumstances of the parties which would justify a modification
of a Decree of Divorce between the time of the entry of their Agreement in June of 1993
and the trial of this matter in November of 1994.
10.

The court finds that the issue which it heard on November 15, 1994

was the reserved issue under paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and paragraph 3 of
the Decree of Divorce which was whether or not the Defendant's employment should be
full time or part time based upon the needs of the children, and the position of each in
this regard, was-specifically reserved for trial, which the court heard and now determines.
11.

The court finds that the parties entered into an Agreement and the

Plaintiff agreed at that time that based upon his earnings, he had the ability to pay the
Defendant $4,000.00 per month as alimony and the Defendant had a need for $4,000.00
per month as alimony and had no income at that time from which to contribute to her
own support and while Defendant claimed she needed a greater sum than $4,000.00 per
month in order to maintain the standard of living that she had enjoyed during the course
of the marriage, she accepted that sum as a compromise of those claims in the belief
that she could maintain an appropriate standard of living accepting that sum.

4

12.

The parties are in conflict with the Plaintiff desiring his children to

obtain religious instruction and participate in swimming, and other sport activities. It
takes transportation and parental direction for those goals to be achieved. They do not
just happen. Children are motivated largely by parents who are at home, not by a
neighbor who picks them up and takes them some place. In order to have the children
pursue their religious and sports activities, it is necessary that the Defendant be involved
with them in doing so. Consequently, while the Plaintiff desires the Defendant to work
full time, he also wants her to provide the direction, support, and transportation the
children need for their religious and sports training and activities. Practically speaking,
if the Defendant is working full time and keeping up a household, she does not have the
time to provide transportation and support for the children in the religious and sports
activities the Plaintiff wishes the children to pursue.
13.

Plaintiff desires the Defendant to work full time as a dental hygienist

and represents to the court that she could earn $4,000.00 per month if she were doing
so. The Defendant does not disagree with the potential earnings asserted by the Plaintiff
but has pointed out to the court that she must work for a dentist and work the hours the
dentist dictate that she work if she works as a dental hygienist. If she does this she will
not be able to provide the transportation and support required by the children to carry
out their religious training, sports and activities.
14.

The Defendant cannot be both a full time dental hygienist and look

after the children and provide the support for their children in their religious and sports
training as both Plaintiff and Defendant want her to do. The court heard testimony from

5
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physicians offered by each party as to whether or not the Defendant will require surgery
to be able to function as dental hygienist. It is the Defendant's position that she could
function as a dental hygienist if she could practice and get tactile sensitivity restored to
her injured wrist. Surgery will not affect the tactility problem that exists. Surgery may
increase her mobility, but it will not affect her ability to feel which she testified is
necessary if she is to function as a dental hygienist.
15.

The court finds that the Defendant excelled in the dental hygienist

examination in those portions of the test that were written, achieving a perfect score.
She failed those portions that were practical because she did not have the tactile ability
to function as required in order to be a dental hygienist. The Defendant testified she did
not know of any program where she could practice working with patients which is
necessary in order to get her tactile functioning restored if it is possible to do so. A
program might be available to do this, but it appears to the court that the real issue is
what are the needs of the children and measure this against the fiscal requirements to
maintain the standard of living established in the Decree. This issue was specifically
reserved in the Findings of Fact and Decree effecting the agreement of the parties.
16.

The Defendant is employed as a substitute school teacher and she

has been able to work on a consistent basis those hours where her children are in
school and this work is the most the Defendant is going to be able to undertake and
provide the religious and sports training support and transportation that she has provided
to the children during the marriage of the parties and since the entry of the Decree. The
Defendant would not be able to secure similar hours as a dental hygienist because a
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dentists hours do not coincide with school hours as do those of the substitute teaching
in which the Defendant has been engaging. The Defendant transports the children to
their religious training, their swimming, their ball games, scouting and all of the various
activities in which they are involved. This does not give her freedom to work more than
she is already working. She is working 32 hours per week, and that is what the court
finds that she could work and provide for the children as she has.
17.

The court finds from hearing the testimony of the Plaintiff and the

Defendant, and considering the positions taken by them in their pleadings, that the
Plaintiff requests this court to choose to sacrifice the children and order the Defendant
to work. The Defendant has chosen not to sacrifice the interests of the children, but to
put them in a paramount position and to work on a secondary basis, and in working 32
hours per week, is working all that she can work and still provide the support to the
children that they need to continue with their activities.
t&

The court has determined that the Defendant could earn $25.00 per

hour instead of $5.90 if she were working as a dental hygienist rather than as a
substitute teacher, but to do so would require her to not provide the parental support to
the minor children of the parties that both Plaintiff and Defendant desire her to provide.
If she does not increase her earnings above their present level, she will over the course
of the court's Order as is hereinafter provided, decrease her income by $1,000.00 per
month in order to provide that assistance to her children.
19.

The court finds that the parties entered into a Stipulation for payment

of child support of $2,100.00 for three children, that the income of the Plaintiff is

7

substantially in excess of the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines, that the parties,
concomitantly with their agreement for support, entered into an agreement for visitation
and did not provide in their agreement for any abatement of child support during the
visitation. Evaluation of the child support shows it is not a standard award, nor is it
statistical variation of the child support guidelines. The agreed upon child support is a
negotiated figure between the parties entered into for the best interests of the children.
20.

Each of the parties have employed counsel to bring this matter

before the court and the issues litigated by them through their counsel are those issues
that were reserved in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and paragraph 3 of the Decree
of Divorce.
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the court now makes and enters
the following,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
\.

There has been no substantial change of circumstances since the

entry of the Decree of Divorce in this case.
2.

The alimony set in the Decree of Divorce effects the decisions of the

parties to provide for the religious and sports training and activities of their children and
still require the Defendant to participate in self support. If Defendant elects to continue
as a substitute teacher, she will not be able to earn the same income that she could earn
as a dental hygienist and her income will decrease. She will thus be presented with the
choice of earning some or all of the income that she could earn as dental hygienist with
that she will earn as a teacher. The alimony award thus made considers and effects the

8
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fact that the Plaintiff earns in excess of $200,000.00 per year and has produced an
affluent lifestyle for himself and the Defendant, that the Defendant has given up her
career as a dental hygienist in order to care for the children of the parties by mutual
agreement, that even though Defendant has suffered a debilitating injury, she could
probably still function as a dental hygienist provided that she did not have to provide
care for the children, but the parties have elected a lifestyle which included a substantial
time commitment from the Defendant to be involved in the religious and sports training
activities for the children, and as the parties live in Park City, and many of these
activities are in Salt Lake City, the Defendant must spend substantial time transporting
the children. The court has determined that the Defendant has sought employment on
her own and has secured employment as a substitute teacher, that considering the
needs of the Defendant if she is to maintain the lifestyle that the parties enjoyed during
their marriage and her own ability to produce income, this court should continue the
alimony as set-at $4,000.00 per month until December 1, 1995 when it should be
reduced by $500.00 per month until December 1, 1996 when it should be reduced by an
additional $500.00 per month and continue thereafter at $3,000.00 per month until the
death or remarriage of the Defendant or further order of the court. As this adjustment
considers and effects what the Defendant can earn herself in order to assist herself in
maintaining the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage and the
ability of the Plaintiff to produce income to both maintain his lifestyle and contribute to
meet the needs of the Defendant.
3.

The parties entered into an agreement for child support at $2,100.00

9
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per month per child and this should not abate during the summer or any period of
extended visitation as it is not a standard child support order and is not based on a
calculation from the child support guidelines. This child support was agreed to based
on the needs of the children at the time the agreement was entered into and therefore
no abatement should occur during visitation.
4.

There has been no substantial change in circumstances in this

matter which would justify any modification of the Decree of Divorce. The matter tried
by the court was one reserved by the parties in paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce.
5.

Each of the parties should assume and bear their own costs and

attorney's fees.
DATED this / £

day of

,;£„*>

, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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APPROVED AS EFFECTING
THE RULING OF THE COURT:

B. L. DART, Counsel
for Plaintiff

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ,
Counsel for Defendant

ADDRESS AND SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBER FOR DEBTOR:
Mr. Lowell Gerber
Social Sec. No. 350-40-2033
8540 College Parkway
Fort Myers, FL 33919
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1 hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this / - ^ - d a y of April, 1995, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the
following individual:
B. L. Dart, Esq.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main, Ste. I330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

>

(LAml\QerL,303)
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
LOWELL GERBER,

<2(g76?4

Plaintiff,

ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

vs.

Civil No. 924905415DA

MARY JO GERBER,

Judge: Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.
—oooOOOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the court on November 15, 1994,
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding for trial of the Plaintiffs Petition to Modify
the Decree of Divorce. The Plaintiff was present in person and represented by counsel,
B. L. Dart. The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S.
Dolowitz. The court heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses, produced by
each of the parties, received into evidence exhibits offered by the parties and being
advised in the premises, the court made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now therefore:

K

_.,

i\ A r- (< < '

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Alimony shall continue to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant

at the rate of $4,000.00 per month until December 1, 1995 at which time it shall be
reduced by $500.00 per month to the sum of $3,500.00 per month and continue at that
rate until December 1, 1996 when it shall be reduced by an additional $500.00 per
month to the sum of $3,000.00 per month at which sum it shall remain or continue until
the death or remarriage of the Defendant or further order of the court.
2.

Child support shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the

rate of $2,100.00 per month and it shall not abate during the summer or any period of
extended visitation.
3.

Each of the parties shall assume and bear their own costs and

attorney's fees.
DATED this / £ day of

s/L~

«»

, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

DOUGbStTcOR'NABY,
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

-.
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APPROVED AS EFFECTING THE
RULING OF THE COURT:

B. L. DART, Counsel
for Plaintiff

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ,
Counsel for Defendant

DEBTOR'S ADDRESS AND
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Lowell Gerber
Social Sec. No. 350-40-2033
8540 College Parkway
Fort Myers, FL 33919
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—000OOO000—

LOWELL GERBER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MARY JO GERBER,

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL AND ON OBJECTIONS TO
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 924905415DA

Defendant.
—000OOO000—

The Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on April 25, 1995. Also on that date he
objected to thefindingsof fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Defendant. The Plaintiff
submitted the affidavit of Dr. Bonnie Branson with his motion The Defendant filed a response to
this motion on May 2, 1995. About May 17, 1995, the Plaintiff filed a response. No one has
requested oral argument on this motion and the court does not believe it would serve any
purpose.
The decree of divorce was entered on November 23, 1993. The decree provided for an
"automatic review of the alimony award in one (1) yearfromthe date of the entry of the Decree
of Divorce, or earlier if circumstances warrant..." The decree also provided that "the issue is
reserved as to whether Defendant's employment should be full or part-time based upon the needs
of the children." The Court heard this matter on November 15, 1994, and took testimony on both
of the above issues and madefindingsand conclusions therefrom.
The Plaintiff wants the Defendant to work full time and earn $4,000 per month as a dental
hygienist. Presumably, if she did earn $4,000 he would not have to pay alimony. The Court
looked at this problem at the trial on November 15, 1994. The Defendant had contacted the
Dental Hygiene School at Weber State University. No program was available. The affidavit of
the Director, Dr. Bonnie Branson, states that there still is no program for the Defendant. A
program could possibly be designed to help the Defendant. Dr. Branson cautions, however, that
the Defendant may not qualify for the admission requirements of the school. If she is admitted to
work in a special program at the school and completes the training the Defendant would still not

be guaranteed certification. The Defendant testified at trial that she still does not have the tactile
ability to function as required in order to be a dental hygienist.
A new trial could not prove that the Defendant has the tactile ability to be a dental
hygienist. It could not prove that the Defendant would qualify for admission to Weber's Dental
Hygiene School, that a special program would in fact be designed, that after completing the
program the Defendant would have the tactile ability to function as a dental hygienist, and that the
Defendant would in fact be certified.
The Court at trial concluded that the Defendant should be able to earn more than her
current monthly income of $300 per month. The Court gave her until December, 1995, to
increase her income by $500 per month, and until December, 1996, to increase her income by
another $500 per month. The Court knew this would be full time work and would not be in the
children's best interest. The Plaintiff, however, insisted upon it.
A new trial would not resolve any compelling issues in this case. The request for a new
trial is denied. If at any time in the future the Defendant in fact works and earns in excess of
$1,300 per month, then it will be appropriate for the Plaintiff to request an alimony modification
hearing.
The Plaintiff has objected to thefindingsof fact and conclusions of law. His objections
really go to the Court's failure to find the facts favorable to him. For example, he objects to
paragraph 4 of the Findings because he claims his expenses have increased in Florida. The Court
does not doubt that the Plaintiff has the ability to spend the entire $4,000 now ordered by the
Court to go to the Defendant as alimony. The Plaintiff is expected to live within his income just
as the Defendant is expected to live within the $4,000 per month alimony.
The Court finds no errors in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. They in fact
reflect the rulings of the Court. The Court does not see that justice would be served by changing
them at this time. The Court approves them and is signing them at the same time as this ruling.
The Defendant is awarded a reasonable attorney fee for defending against these
proceedings.
Dated June 16, 1995.
By the Court:
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ(0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O.Box I 1008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
LOWELL GERBER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.

Civil No. 924905415DA

MARY JO GERBER,

Judge: Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.
—oooOOOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs Motion
for New Trial and Objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by
Defendant's counsel to effect the ruling of the Court after the trial held on November 15,1994. The
Court considered the pleadings submitted by each of the parties in support of their position and issued
its Ruling, declaring its basis for its decision that Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and Objections to the
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not well taken.
Accordingly,

A-^l
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Plaintiffs request for a new trial is denied.

2.

The proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do reflect the rulings of

the Court and the Court has approved and executed them.
3.

Defendant is awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred by her in defending

these proceedings.

She shall submit appropriate application and support therefor for further

consideration by this Court.

DATED J_51 day of

JJAAJKU^T,

1995.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. CORNAB
Third Judicial District Court
APPROVED AS TO
(>?.
FORM A h t f ^ e e N ^ j T : '

?(J\^
B. L. DART
Attorney for Plaintiff

Q'
A ,

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Defendant
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PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

STATEMENT OP MONTHLY INCOME
LOWELL GERBER
(From Year-to-date Paystub attached/ 9.69 Months)

Paystub
9.69 mo.

Monthly
Average

Gross monthly salary
($200,000/year)

$7,692.31

$16,666.66

Less:
FICA

$(6,157.70)

(635.39)

Federal taxes

(37,571.59)

(3,877.36)

Alimony

(4,000.00)
(2,100.00)

Child Support
NET EXPENDABLE MONTHLY INCOME

K

$6/053.91

-> r

'HWEST FLORIDA HEART GROUP, P.A. FORT MYERS FL 33919

>r2.od: 1 0 / 0 1 / 9 4 - 1 0 / 1 4 / 9 4
Type
//ours Earn Amount
*guJar

80.00

ieck

2 1 3 4 0 Date:

#.

f>*f i^i*^*-*! *<• v

W*; **,, «* sjfcoWff^

021340
Ded

Amount

Current
Cross
FICA
FEDS

Check Amount

10/19/94

^ ' T N M 8 # ^

A-31
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CHECK NO.
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<\ I t*Ai

$7,692.31
$111.54
$2, 352. 06

$161,538.53
$6,157.70
$37, 571. 59

$5,228.71

« 8 ^ ^ « ^ > 5 J4^i>ttn*^
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STATEMENT OF MONTHLY LIVING EXPENSES
LOWELL GERBER

Mortgage payment
Homeowners insurance—$560/year
Flood insurance—$105/year

^7Jf^°

,005
47
9

Homeowners association fee—$l/200/year

100

Maintenance—Home, lawn, pool

225

Utilities

200

Telephone, including cellular

250

Food and household supplies

400

Housekeeper

86

Laundry/dry cleaning

80

Clothing
Dental

150
60

Disability insurance

613

Automobile and boat insurance

230

Health club
Entertainment
Cable TV

20
250
50

Travel costs—
Children's visitation, 3x year @$650 x 3 children
Lowell

487
300

Child care—summer camp and babysitter during visits

100

Automobile expenses (personal portion)

150

Gifts:

Birthdays, Barmitzvas, Christmas,
other family holidays

400

Accounting (tax advice/tax returns)

100

Legal

200

Incidentals

50

Installment payments @10%/month—see list below*
College prepayment plan beg. 1/95 (2 children)
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES

$4,300

Circuit City/computer

3,500

Save-On Furniture

1,800

VISA/airfare

3,175

Total installment debts

600

$8,439

installment debts:
Robin Stuckey/furniture

1 ,277

$12,775

A-31

B. L. DART (818)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LOWELL GERBER,
Plaintiff,

FINANCIAL DECLARATION

v.

Civil No. 924905415

MARY JO GERBER,

Dated: June, 1993
Hon. Richard H. Moffat
Hon. Michael S. Evans

Defendant.
oooOooo
Husband:
Address:

Soc. Sec. #
Occupation:
Employer:
Birrhdate:

LOWELL GERBER
5260 S. Landings Dr.
F501
Ft. Myers, FL 33919
350-40-2033
Physician
Southwest Florida Heart Group
8-22-49

STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on a
biweekly basis, multiply by 2.167)
HUSBAND
WIFE
1.
Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including
commissions, bonuses,
allowances and overtime

$16,666.671

Imputea
$2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 2

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME

$16,666.67

$2,000.00

P l a i n t i f f 1 s salary commencing May 1, 1993.
defendant has a college degree and has been certified as a
dental hygienist. The income capacity of a dental hygienist is
between $150-200 per day or $3,000-4,000 per month. Even working
part-time, defendant has the capacity to earn $2,000 which should
be imputed to her.

2.

Monthly deductions from gross income:
Income taxes:

State/Federal

$(4,759.36)

Number of Exemptions taken:
Social Security

$(1,275.19)

Medical or other insurance (describe)
Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan
Credit union
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS

$ (6,034.55)

3.

NET MONTHLY INCOME

$10,6 3 2.12

4.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS:
Creditor's Name /Purpose

Balance

Monthly
Payment

(H) Elam, Burke, Boyd/Idaho Antitrust

$8,326.55

$500.00

(H) Robb Stucky/furniture

$8,060.00

300.00

(H) Sun Bank/car loan

18,000.00

500.00

(J) First Security/Park City mortgage 206,000.00

$2,546.00

A^A\

ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES known to me owned individually or
jointly.
Current
Value
(a)

Household furniture/furnishings,
appliances, equipment:
(W) Family Affairs appraisal
(H) $4,000 + 10,000 new purchase

(b)

$14,334
14,000

(8,060)

Automobiles:
20,000

(W) 1993 Ford Aerostar

(c)

Owed
Thereon

(H) 1993 Mitsubishi

22,000

(H) 1983 Porsche

13,000

(18,000)

Securities, stocks, bonds:
(H) North Carolina NG
(H) GTE

2,502
1,200

(W) Payne Olsen #503431 (est)
14,000
(Need current statement from defendant)
(W) Stocks in safe deposit box
(Defendant was to inventory)
(d)

?

Cash and deposit account:
See list attached.

(e)

Life Insurance:
Name of Company

Policy No-

(H) Minnesota #1-781-6363
#1-782-958
(H) Beneficial #BL108375*3

(f)

Face Amt.

Cash value

359,598

2,284

800,000

6,013

750,000

-0-

Profit Sharing or Retirement Accounts/IRA's:

Name of Plan or Where Held
See list attached re IRA's.

X
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Value and
Amount Nov;
Vested

(g)

Other Personal Property and Assets and Values:

(h)

Real Estate:

None

Type of Property:
Residence
Address: 3028 Meadows Dr.
Date Acquired:
8/89
Park City, UT
Present Value:
$382,000
Original Cost:
$350,000
Basis of Valuation:
Cost of Additions:
Webber appraisal
Total Cost:
Mortgage Balance: $206,000
Other Liens:
Equity:
$176,000
To Whom: First Secuirty
Monthly Payment: $ 2,546
Taxes/year:
$
4,201
Comments: Refinancing in progress; will lower payment to
approximately $1,800.

Address:

Type of Property:
Lot
Date Acquired:
Present Value:
$10,000
Basis of Valuation:
Comparable sales

Bear Lake

Original Cost:
Cost of Additions:
Total Cost:
Mortgage Balance: - 0 Other Liens:
Equity:
Monthly Paymenr:
Taxes/year:
Individual Contributions:

Address:

To Whom:

Type of Property:
Condo/Timeshare
Date Acquired:
Present Value:
$10,000
Basis of Valuation:
Opinion based on cost.

New Orleans

Original Cost:
Cost of Additions:
Total Cost:
Mortgage Balance:
Other Liens:
Equity:
Monthly Payment:
Taxes/year:
Individual Contributions:
(i)

To Whom:

Business Interest:
(H) Lowell Gerber, P.C. checking acct
(H) Medical receivables

Accounts

are over

A

y\ X

(6/22/93

12,8943

6/22/93

120 d a y s a n d b a s i c a l l y

$ 9,404

not

collectible.

6.

MONTHLY EXPENSES:
Rent
Power
Phone
Water
Food and household supplies
Clothing
Laundry
Auto insurance
Automobile expenses: gasoline, maintenance
Life insurance
Health insurance (family coverage)
Children f s psycnologist
Entertainment
Health club
Travel (travel cost in connection v/ith
children's visitation 2x/year each)
Haircuts
Newspaper/Magazines
Gifts, including Christmas
Incidentals
Debt service
TOTAL MONTHLY LIVING EXPENSES
Currently also paying Park City mortgage
TOTAL CURRENT EXPENSES

K-^

(j)

Other Assets:
(H) Wilmac Partnership T0864
(formerly in Pension Plan)

$44,958

(H) Idaho Falls Antitrust Suit
Settled
(Case settled on "walk-away11 basis; no monies reco
Attorney's fees still owed by plaintiff of $8,000
(H) Park City Doctors Suit

A-A5

?

FINANCIAL AND IRA ACCOUNTS
Gerber v. Gerber

Merrill Lynch Accounts:
(J)

CMA #587-29077

(H)

WCMA #330-97271

(W)
(H)

(1/31/93)

$177,874

(1/31/93)

75,978

IRA #587-83743

(12/31/92)

18,534

IRA #584-83744

(1/31/93)

279,525

First Security Accounts:
(J)
(W)
(W)

FSB #18101217 (6/21/93)
MMA #18101203 (6/21/93
MMA #217-804650-17 (6/21/93)

1,216
847
2,683

(J)

MMA #217-80803-16

4,836

(W)
(W)
(H)
(H)

IRA
IRA
IRA
IRA

(6/21/93)

#600030024692514
#600310024665916
#60003002466114
#600310024692417

(1/31/93)
(1/31/93)
(1/31/93)
(1/31/93)

632
8,475
32,574
8,475

Other accounts:
(H)

Keystone IRA (1/31/93)

5,519

(H)

Travellers IRA F973347-21269320

5,185

A~^

STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I hereby certify that the matters stated herein are true and
correct,

,^^Xy{
LOWELL GERBER,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e
1993.
Notary FWc

Commi9S

JEHMFSROCSON
310 SouhUm #1330
Sa*Lsk»C*y.Ufeh 84101
My Ccrnmfc*bn Expires
Mardi23,1997
p i r e s S f c t o erf Utah

^

I
i
!
1
I
•

A-AI

r.e t h i s

Plaintiff
^(Tday

of

Wife's ( )

Husband's (X)
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF PENDING
DIVORCE LITIGATION
Child Support:

$700/child

Total (per month)

$2 , 100*

Alimony:

$3 ,000

Total (per month)

$3 , 000**

*At such time as only two minor children reside at home, support
would automatically reduce to $1,400, and when only one minor
child is at home, support would reduce to $825.
**Alimony at $3,000 per month for period of one year, then to
automatically reduce to $2,000 per month, until such time as
plaintiff remarries, cohabits, dies or there is a change of
financial circumstances of the parties warranting reduction.

PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION:
1.
Defendant to be awarded custody of the three minor
children subject to plaintiff's visitation as follows:
a.
One half of summer vacation, including the
right to have any one or two children for a separate one-week
period as part of his half summer with each child. Plaintiff
would provide defendant with at. least two months notice of when
he is choosing to exercise his summer visitation.
b.
Plaintiff should have the right to have the
children for one-half the Christmas break with Christmas Eve and
Christmas Day being alternated between plaintiff and defendant.
Plaintiff shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas
Day and half the Christmas break in even-nunbered years and
defendant shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas
Day in odd-numbered years.
c.
Plaintiff should have the right to visit with
the children anytime he is in Utah upon providing to plaintiff as
much advance notice as he has of his trip to Utah. In the event
the notice is less than 24 hours, Dr. Gerber would respect any
other scheduled activities the children have.
d.
One half of holidays, to be alternated
between the parties.
e.
A weekend for each child within the week or
two of that childfs birthday.

A-A8

2.
Plaintiff will maintain health insurance coverage
on the minor children so long as they qualify as dependents.
3.
Plaintiff should be awarded the income tax
exemptions for the children based on his paying child support in
excess of the Guidelines.
4.
Assets divided as set forth on attached "Proposed
Distribution of Assets".
5.
Each party to pay his or her own respective
attorney's fees and costs.

&-4q

6/22/93
PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
Gerber v. Gerber
Mary Jo
J

Park City home equity

$176,000

Bear Lake lot

10,000

New Orleans condo

10,000

household furniture
3

Lowell

14,334

5,940

Vehicles:
1993 Ford Aerostar

20,000

1992 Mitsubishi Diamante

22,000

1983 Porsche

-0-

Merrill Lynch accounts:
4

CMA #587-29077 $177,874

WCMA #330-97271
IRA #587-83743

(1/93)

$75,978

(1/93)

(12/92) (w)

IRA #584-83-7-44 $279,525

71,227

(1/93) (h]

106,647
75,978

18,534
139,763

139,763

First Security accounts:
5

MMA # 1 8 1 0 1 2 1 7

(6/21/93)

1,216

MMA #18101203 (6/21/93)
MMA #217-80465-17 (6/21/93)
MMA #217-80803-16 (6/21/93)

847
2,683

6

632
8,475

IRA
IRA
IRA
IRA

#600030024692514 (v)
#600310024665916 (w)
#60003002466114
(h)
#600310024692417 (h)

4,836

32,574
8,475

Dther accounts/stocks:
Keystone IRA 1/31/93
North Carolina NG
GTE
7
Payne Olsen #503431 (est.)
8
Stocks in safe deposit box
Wilmac Partnership T0864

5,519
2,502
1,200
14,000
?
44,958

Mary J o
Insurance

Policies:

^ T r a v e l l e r s #073347-2269320
M i n n e s o t a #1-781-6363
#1-782-958
12
B e n e f i c i a l #BL1083753
13
,4

I6

Lowell G e r b e r ,

5,185
2,284
6,013
-0-

P.C.

9,404

Medical r e c e i v a b l e s

15

Lowell

Idaho F a l l s A n t i t r u s t

1/2
Suit

1/2
(8,000)

Park C i t y D o c t o r s S u i t

TOTAL VALUES

$476,495

A^l

$476,494

Explanatory notes:

1.

Webber appraisal $382,000 less outstanding mortgage $206,000 = equity
$176,000.

2.

Furniture in Mary Jo's possession from Family Affairs appraisal.
Since the parties' separation, Dr. Gerber purchased $3-4,000 worth of
furniture prior to moving to Florida. Since moving to Florida, he has
purchased another $10,000 on which he owes $8,060.

3.

Vehicle values are based on purchase prices.
The 1983 Porsche has just been acquired for $18,000 and is financed by
an $18,000 credit line owed to Sun Bank.

4.

This account is being used as the "plug figure" to achieve parity of
the overall marital estate.

5.

Money market account balances per telephone quote to Jennifer Olson
from First Security Bank 6/21/93.

5.

Balances 1/31/93.

7.

Defendant was to obtain a statement on current value.

I.

Defendant was to provide inventory of stocks in deposit box.

).

Steps being taken to contact Bill Maeck in Idaho Falls to arrive at
current value.

Each to take IRA's m

own name.

0.

This is an IRA.

1.

Face values $359,598 and $800,000 respectively.

2.

Face $750,000.

3.

Current balance 6/22/93 in P.C. checking account.

4.

Collectibility of receivables is doubtful as all are over 120 days
old.
Defendant proposes receivables be accounted for as received
after payment of expenses including salary of Lynn Pace and fees for
collection agency. Net: receivables should be divided between parties
with each to bear tax consequences of their share.

5.

This case was settled on a walk-away basis with no monies received.
Plaintiff presently still owes $8,000 in attorney's fees related to
the suit.

6.

Filing of suit is imminent. Plaintiff would agree to take this asset
subject to any liabilities; otherwise would divide equally with
defendant with her to share liabilities. It is plaintiff's belief
that the Park City situation is a negative and any recovery would only
be offset against liability exposure for the remaining 2-1/2 years of
the lease.

h-52.

DEFENDANT'S

B. L. DAJRT (818)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3io South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383

isuMos+jsr*

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LOWELL GERBER,
Plaintiff,

FINANCIAL DECLARATION

v.

Civil No. 924905415DA

MARY JO GERBER,

Dated:

August, 19 94

Hon. Richard H. Moffat
Hon. Michael S. Evans

Defendant.
oooOooo
Husband:
Address:

LOWELL GERBER
4120 Steamboat Bend E
Apt- 3 06
Ft. Myers, FL 3 3919
Soc. Sec. #: 350-40-2033
Occupation: Physician
Eraployer: Southwest Florida
Heart Group
Birthdate: 8/22/49

Wife:
Address:
Soc* Sec. r'
Occupation:
Employer:
Birthdate:

STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on a
biweekly basis, multiply by 2.167)
HUSBAND
Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including
commissions, bonuses,
allowances and overtime,
payable biweekly
(see paystub attached)

A

$16,669.23

WIFE

p e n s i o n and

retirement

S o c i a l Sfecxxxit.^
pisability
public

and

unemployment

assistance

C h i l d s u p p o r t from
prior marriage
Dividends and

any

interest

pents
Other sources:
tfOTAL M O N T H L Y I N C O M E

2.

$16,669,23

M o n t h l y d e d u c t i o n s from g r o s s
Xivcai&e. t ^ x e s \

income:

F^deral / state

C3 > G 4 2.14 }

d u m b e r of E x e m p t i o n s t a k e n :
Social Security

(1,275.19)

fledical or other i n s u r a n c e
U n i o n or o t h e r
Retirement
Savings
Credit
Other

(describe)

dues

or p e n s i o n

fund

plan
union

(specify)

£OTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS
3.

tfET

$(4,317.33)

MONTHLY INCOME

$12,351.90

k-5*\

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS:
Creditor's Name/Purpose

Balance

Robb & Stucky/Furniture

$4,481.78

$250.00

$52,000,00

$2,100.00

Heritage Bank/Construction Loan

5.

Monthly
Payment

ALL PROPERTY OP THE PARTIES known to me owned individually or

jointly.

PLEASE NOTE: The parties were divorced in July 1993 and divided
their property interests
at that time, and there are no property
issues relevant to this modification
proceeding.

/V-55"

6-

MONTHLY EXPENSES:
Mortgage payment

$2 1100

(Mortgage rate will rise 1-2% next year)
Maintenance and homeowners association fee

3 00

Food and household supplies

4 00

Utilities

200

Telephone

150

Laundry/cleaning

80

Clothing

150

Dental

100

Insurance (disability)

800

Child c a r e — s u m m e r camp and babysitter during
visitation periods
Health club

100
40

Entertainment

5 00

Incidentals

50

Travel c o s t s — c h i l d r e n ' s visitation

800

Automobile expenses

3 50

Installment payment: Furniture
Florida college prepayment plan (2 children)
TOTAL

A-5fc>

250
6Q0_
$6,370

STATE OF FLORIDA
ss.

COUNTY OF

I hereby certify that the matters stated herein are true and
correct.

-o
LOWELL I. GERBER, Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before roe this //

(jjspufjr

day of

_. iM

0*i.:.

A

NOTARY PUBLIC , ^ . J
Residing at 1'tdtot. I L/J)
Commission expires:.
jffiBfo

ROSNB.KiLEa

£ ? & V - tfYCC**C$$»N# CO 2681*9

.&
&HPES:M& 17.1997
3^ ZXWT^VW *&**<*****
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.,- ;
Kri

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ Bar No.
Attorney
for
Defendant
of and
for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL,

0899
P. C.

525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0008
Telephone:
[801] 532-2666
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LOWELL GERBER,
FINANCIAL

DECLARATION

Civil No.

924905415

Plaintiff,
vs.
Date:

June 23, 1993

MARY JO GERBER,
Commissioner Michael S. Evans
Defendant,
-oooOooo
Husband: Lowell Gerber
Addre s s:
350-40-2033
Soc. Sec. No.
Physician
Occupation:
Employer: Southwest Florida
Heart Group
Birth Date:
8/22/49

Wife: Marv Jo Gerber
Address:
302 8 Meadows Drive
Park Citv, Utah
Soc. Sec. No. 529-72-9417
Occupation: _ Komemaker
Employer:
-0Birth Dare:

7/6/51

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK
5 DAYS PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO
COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL AUTHORIZE THE
COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS
DECISION.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE
PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.

STATEMENT OF INCOME,

EXPENSES,

ASSETS

AND

LIABILITIES

(Note:
To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4. 3; If figures are on a biweekly basis, multiply by 2.167)

1.

Public Assistance
(welfare, AFDC payments, etc. ):
_
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest:
.
Rents:
All other sources (specify)
,

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME:
ITEMIZE
MONTHLY
INCOME: - -

DEDUCTIONS

FROM GROSS

State and federal income taxes:
,
Number of exemptions taken:
Social Security:
Medical or other insurance
(describe
fully):
Union or other dues:
_
Retirement or pension funds:
Savings Plan:
Credit Union:
Other (specify):

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS:
3.

WIFE

16,666.00

-0-

GROSS MONTHLY INCOME FROM:
Salary and wages, including commissions,
bonuses, allowances and over-time,
payable:
(pay period)
Pensions and retirement:
Social Security:
Disability and unemployment insurance:

2.

HUSBAND

NET MONTHLY INCOME - TAKE HOME PAY:

- 2 -

A~-5<\

4.

DEBTS AND

OBLIGATIONS:

Creditor' s Name

Date
Payable

For

First Security

1st Morta.

6206, 000

TOTAL:
*Is

in process

of

being

Balance

$

Monthly
Payment
*S2. 546. 00

$

refinanced.

ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES know to me owned Individually
or
jointly
(Indicated
who holds
or how title
held:
(H) Husband,
(W)
Wife,
or (J) Jointly).
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE
INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE.
PI alntlff
(a)

Household f u r n i s h i n g s ,
furniture,
a p p l i a n c e s , and e q u i p m e n t :

(b)

Automobile (Year-Make):
1993 - Ford Aerostar
1993 - Mitsubishi

(c)

Securities - stocks, bonds:
S&e attached Exhibit " C

(d)

Cash and deposit accounts (banks,
savings & loans, credit unions savings & checking:
See attached Exhibit "C"

(e)

Life Insurance:

Name of Company

Policy
No.

FacB Amt.

See attached Ex. " C"

- 3 -

t\~GQ

Defendant

-f-

14,334.00

-022,000.00

20,000.00
-0-

Cash Value, accumulated
dividend, or loan amt.

(f)

Profit Sharing or
Retirement Accounts

Name:
Name:
Name:

See attached Ex. "C"

(g)

Other Personal Property and Assets (Specify):

(h)

Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned,
attach sheet with identical information for all additional
property):

Address:

Value of Interest and Amount
Presently Vested

302 8 Meadows Drive
Park City, Utah 84060

Type of Property: Single Family
Date of Acquisition: Aug. 198 9

Original Cost:
$ 350,000.00 Total Present Value: 5382,000.00
Cost of Additions: $
Basis for Valuation: Appraised by
Total Cost:
$ 350,000.00
Jerry Webber
Mtg. Balance:
$ 206, 000. 00
Other Liens:
$
-0Equity:
$ 17. 700. 00
Monthly Amortization $ 2, 546. 00 And to Whom:
First Security
Taxes: $ 4, 201. 00
Individual Contributions:
*Bear Lake lot to Defendant and New Orleans time share to Plaintiff.
(i)

Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business,
value less indebtedness):

(j)

Other Assets (Specify):

- 4
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TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES:
*(Specify which party is the custodial
parent and list names and relationship of all members of the
household whose expenses are included)

Rent or Mortgage Payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence) f 4, 992. 00/vr)
Real property insurance (residence) (61.080/yr)
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies
Utilities inc. water, electricity, gas & heat
electricity, 680.00; Mtn. Fuel, 6140; water,
aarbaae, 653. 00
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning
Clothing
Medical
(defendant only)(S250/ded. + 640/mth)
Dental
(defendant only)
Insurance (life, health, accident, comprehensive
liability) exclude payroll deducted (COBRA)
Child Care
Payment of child spousal support prior marriage
School
Entertainment
(includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation) Travel, SI 50;Clubs
S50. 00
Incidentals
(grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts
and donations} (Grooming, 660; Gifts, 660)
Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto e x p e n s e ( g a s , o i l , r e p a i r , i n s u r a n c e )
fcas, 6160; insurance, S80. 30)
Auto payments
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach
itemized schedule if not fully set forth in
(d) on the first page hereof)
Other expenses
(Insert total and specify on
attached schedule)
See attached Schedules
for Rebecca (6409.29), David (6421.87); Jonathan
6407. 20)
Cable T. V.
Professional Dues ($150.00/yr)
Anticipated taxes:
TOTAL EXPENSES:

2, 546. 00*
416.00
90. 00
500. 00
900.00
273.00
85. 00
100. 00
60. 83
171.00
?
200. 00
120.00
240.30

1,238. 36
65.00
.12.50
?
$7,017.99

*Is being refinanced to approximately $1,800.00.

-

D

-

/VfcZ

Gerber
Additional
NAME:

Monthly

v.

Gerber

Expenses

Rebecca

for

Minor

Age: 13
(11-17-79)

Children
Sex:

Doctor:
($250. 00 deductible)
Dentist:
$150. 00/yr.
minimum
Optometrist
* Orthodontist
Drugs/prescriptions

$ 20. 83
$ 12. 50
$
?
$
-0$
7. 00

School
Lunches
**Allowance

$ 21. 50
$ 40. 00

($1. 25 x 5 x 4. 3)

Lessons:

- piano
- religious

lessons

($400. OOO/yr)

$ 40. 00
$ 33.33

Acti vi ties:
- Skiing
=
$100. 00/yr.
- Swim team = $480. OO/yr.
- Weight training
= $6. 00/week

$ 8. 33
$ 40. 00
$ 25. 80

Clothing:
Shoes:
($300. OO/yr)

$ 75. 00
$ 25. 00

Other:
- Grooming
- Books
- Gifts
for

$ 40. 00
$ 10. 00
$ 10. 00

friends
Total

($120. OO/yr. )
monthly

expenses

*At present
provided
by Defendant' s
father
**Will be putting
half of allowance
in
savings

A-G3

$409. 29

Female

Gerber
Additional
NAME:

Monthly

-

clarinet

for Minor
Acre:
11
(2-26-82)

Doctor:
($250.
Dentist
($150.
Optometrist
*Orthodontist
Dugs/prescriptions

Lessons:
- piano
- religious

Gerber

Expenses

David

School
lunches
**Allowance

v.

00 deducihle/yr.
)
OO/yr.
minimum)

($1. 25 x 5 x 4. 3)

lesson

($400. OO/yr. )

(rental)

Children
Sex:

Male

$ 20. 83
$ 25. 50
$
$
-•0$ 7. 00
$ 21. 50
$ 40. 00
$ 40. 00
$ 33. 33
$ 15. 00

Activities:
-

$ 8. 33
$ 14. 58
$'40. 00
$ 25. 80

skiing
= $100. OO/yr
scouting
= $175/yr
swim team = $480/yr
weight training = $6. 00/wk

Clothing:
Shoes ($300/yr. )

$ 75. 00
$ 25. 00

Other:
- Grooming
- Books
- Gifts for

$ 15. 00
$10. 00
$ 5. 00

friends

($60. OO/yr. )

Total monthly

expenses

*At present provided by Defendant' s father
**Will he putting
half of allowance in savings.

A-H

$421.

87

Cerber
Additional

NAME:

Monthly

v.

Expenses

Jonathan

for

Minor

Children

Acre: 10
(6-14-83)

Doctor:
($250. 00/yr.
Dentist:
($150. 00/yr
Optometrist
*
Orthodontist
Dru gs /pres cripti
ons
School
lunches
**Allowance

Gerber

deductible)
minimum)

($1. 25 x 5 x 4. 3)

Lessons:
piano
- religious
lessons
- band instrument

Sex:

$
$
$
$
$

20. 83
12. 50
?
~•07. 00

$ 21. 50
$ 40. 00
$ 40. 00
$ 33. 33
$ 15. 00

=
$400/yr.
rental

Activities:
- Skiing
=
$100.
00/yr.
- Swim team = $480. OO/yr.
- Scouting
=
$100. OO/yr.
- Basketball
= $ 55. OO/yr
- Weight training
= $6. 00/wk.
Clothing:
Shoes:
($300.
OO/yr)

$
8. 33
S 40. 00
$ 8. 33
S 4. 58
$ 25. 80
$ 75. 00
S 25. 00

Other:
grooming
books
- gifts
for

($60. OO/yr. )

$15. 00
S 10. 00
$ 5. 00

monthly

$40 7. 20

friends
Total

expenses

*At present
provided
by Defendant'
s
father.
**Will be putting
half
of allowance
in
savings.
mb\dsd\gerber\anticipated

monthly

expenses

/\-(o5

Male

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
OF PENDING
DIVORCE
LITIGATION

Child Support $ 2, 100. 00

Total (per month) $2, 100. 00

Alimony $ 4,000, 00

Total (per month) $4,000.00

Property Distribution:
CUSTODY:
Defendant to be awarded sole custody of three minor children.
Plaintiff to have reasonable visitation.
VISITATION: Plaintiff to be awarded four (4) weeks each year/each child;
one-half of Christmas and such other times as mutually agreed upon when
Plaintiff is in Utah with sufficient prior notice to Defendant.
CHILD SUPPORT:
(Worksheet attached) $2,100.00 reducing to $1,550.00 and
then $1,112.00 as each child reaches the age of majority. (Exhibit "A").
HEALTH INSURANCE:
Plaintiff to keep minor children covered through his
place of employment. Defendant to be covered by COBRA.
TAX EXEMPTIONS:

To be awarded to Defendant.

ALIMONY:
$4,000.00/month to be reviewed when Defendant has obtained
employment. Re-training may be necessary because of medical problem.
HOME:
Defendant to be awarded possession of the marital home until
youngest child has reached 18.
At that time it would be sold and
Plciintiff would receive his share of equity (see attached appraisal Exhibit " B" . )
OTHER REAL PROPERTY:

Bear Lake lot to Defendant and New Orleans condo no

Plaintiff.
VEHICLES:

1993 Mitsubishi to Plaintiff; 1993 Ford Aerostar to Defendant.

BANK ACCOUNTS:

As per attached Exhibit "C M .

STOCKS AND SECURITIES:
RETIREMENT/PENSION PLAN:
PERSONAL PROPERTY:

As per attached Exhibit •'CM .
As per attached Exhibit "C".

As divided (see attached appraisal, ExhibitM D M ) .

OTHER PROPERTY:

-0-

LIFE INSURANCE:

As per attached Exhibit "C".
- 6 -
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DEBTS:

-0-

OTHER:

-0-

ATTORNEY, S FEES:

Plaintiff to pay Defendant' s attorney' s fees.

- 7 -
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I, Mary Jo Gerber, propose the above settlement.

If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately
hours and

3

6

witnesses will be called for this party.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.
)

I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct.

1l'<sV
MARY JO/jSE^BER/Defendant
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s

/£,

day of
/

1993.

iJuu//?0A»~,J&
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at : rjUt
NOTARY PUBLIC

i

'My Commission expires
July to. 1994

;

-

tfc-As

*£&£.

TO s*8¥E Q?R£W8£L&k HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING
lmURMATlUN
NEUES&AUY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS
DECLARATION,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST
RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS,
PASSBOOKS,
CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS, CERTIFICATES,
POLICIES AND OTHER
RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.

-

8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or empoloyed in the law firm
of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. , 525 East First South, Suite 500, P.O.
Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah

84147-0008, and that in said capacity, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINANCIAL DECLARATION to
be mailed to the person(s) named below:
B. L. Dart, Esq.
310 South Main Street, Ste. 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Counsel for Plaintiff
on t h i s

/ V* d a y of _

yo^^?
yc~—<?

,

(mb\dsd\Gerber.Fin)

- 9 -
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1993.
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899)
of and for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South
Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666

"^

.w.-v \ \

'"'

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LOWELL GERBER

CHILD

Plaintiff,

{Sole

SUPPORT
OBLIGATION
WORKSHEET

Custody

C i v i l No.

vs.
MARY J O

and

Paternity}

924905415

C o m m i s s i o n e r M i c h a e l S.

GERBER

Evans

Defendant
—oooOooo
MOTHER
|l.
]
|
|2a.
j
j
|2b.
|
!
J2c.
|
|
|2d.
j
|
j3.
|
i
|4.
|
|
1

FATHER

COMBINED

E n t e r t h e c o m b i n e d number of n a t u r a l
| \\\\\\\\\j\\\\\\\\\\j
c h i l d r e n a n d a d o p t e d c h i l d r e n of t h i s
j\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ | WWWWW j
3
mother and f a t h e r
1\ \ \ \ \ \ W \ 1WWWWW 1
E n t e r t h e f a t h e r ' s and m o t h e r ' s g r o s s
|$ - 0 |$ 16,666
j \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
monthly income. Refer t o i n s t r u c t i o n s
|
J
| WXWWWWW
f o r d e f i n i t i o n of i n c o m e
I
i
'WWW \ WWW
Enter p r e v i o u s l y o r d e r e d alimony t h a t i s | |j WXWWWWW
a c t u a l l p a i d . (Do n o t e n t e r a l i m o n y
j
j
j WXWWWWW
ordered for t h i s case)
1
!
j WXWWWWW.
Enter previously ordered c h i l d support
|j
j WXWWWWW
(Do n o t e n t e r o b l i g a t i o n s o r d e r e d f o r
j
|
1 WXWWWWW
the children in t h i s case
i
|
i WXWWWWW
O p t i o n a l : E n t e r t h e amount from L i n e 12 | |
| WXWWWWW
of t h e C h i l d r e n I n P r e s e n t Home Workj
j
j WXWWWWW
sheet for e i t h e r oarent.
1
1
1 WXWWWWW
S u b s t r a c t L i n e 2 b , 2 c , a n d 2d from 2 a .
|$ - 0 | 16,666
j$
16,666
This i s t h e Adjusted Monthly Gross
|
|
1
Gross for c h i l d support purposes.
!
!
1
T a k e t h e COMBINED f i g u r e i n L i n e 3 and
|\W\WXX
2, 100
t h e number of c h i l d r e n i n L i n e 1 t o t h e jWWXWX
S u p p o r t T a b l e . F i n d t h e B a s e Combined
| W W W W IWWWWWj
Support O b l i g a t i o n .
IWWXXW IWWWWWI

iww\ww\l$
IWWWWWJ

EXHIBIT A

5.

Divide each parent's adjusted monthly
-0100%
gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED adjusted
montly gross in Line 3 .
$2,100.00
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each
parent's share of the Base Support
Obligation.
.
7. Enter the children's portion of monthly
medical and dental insurance premiums
paid to insurance company.
Enter the monthly work or training
related child care expense for the
children in Line l,
wwww wwwww
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor parent.
10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award. Subtrsct the Obligor's
Line 7 from Line 9.
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child. Divided Line 10
bv Line 1.
_
_____
12. CHILD CARE AWARD.
Multiply Line 8 by .50 to obtain Obligor's share of child
care expenses. Add Line 10 only when expense is actually
incurred.
__

wwww wwwww
wwww wwwww

$10,000.00 = $1,808.00
$ 6,666.00
= $ 300.00 (60 x $5.00)
-_- $2,108.00

A-ii

\\\\\\\\\\\\\
\\\\\\\\\\\\\

WWWWWXW
WWWWWXW

\wwwwww
W
WWWWXW
WWWWWXW

WWWWWXW
WWWWWXW
-0-

$2,100.00

j e r r y K . wBDoet
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Property DgscrtpCoo A Anah/ajts

3 0 2 8 MEADOES DRIVE
st.*. UEAHapCod.
84060
OrPARK CITY
couny SUMMIT
8 L^o^o^on LOT 2 9 , RIDGEVIEW SUBDIVISION
B
M.pw
RV 29
GERHER
P R O P RIGHTS APPRAISED
J
6
F M SfrnpW

I.

MTUMI

4 / 1 5 6 . 6 3 PD T«YW

1992

NCNE

HOAH*)

LOCATION

Sete P f * *

Mortgega Amount

Dteoounl P o * t e and O t « r Conoeeetone
Paid by SeWr

Oe M M n u l PUO

Suburb**

Rural

Source

NEIGHBORHOOD ANALYSIS

25-78%

Undar 2S%

Employment Stebefty

Rapid

Stabte

Stow

Convenience to Employment

PROPERTY VALUES

knoreaetrtg

Stmt**

Oecfteng

C^nventenoe to Shopceng

DEMAND/SUPPLY

Shortage

In Balance

Ov*r BuctVy

Convenience to Sohoote

3-6 Mo*.

Over 8 M o *

Ad*<*jecy of Pubao Trenaporteaon

LAND U S E %

8«^te FemJy

_

2-4 Famey

PREDOMINANT

LANO U 8 e CHANGE

55

8

No«*e»y

__

NA

|

Condom*T*jr« (HUO/VA)

|Over 7 8 %

PfULUHT

|

MoHgege T»pe

QrtOWTH R A T €

lUnder 3 M o *

|

Oate

BU1.TUP

MARKET»«3 T W C

urv.

LENneR DISCRETIONARY use

leaeehoid

DAVID S . DOIOvvTTZ AND B. L. DART
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

i'ii_rfu-*-nnio

J l a N o R V 29

SINGLE FAMILY H O U S I N G Aeortaton FeUfaea

OCCUPANCY

PRICE

AGE

Owner

• (000)

(r«l

_250_Law
450 i n *

<0~8%»

_2

25

Adequacy of U « * t e *
Property CompeaNtry
Proteoton from O e t t n e n U J CondMone
Po«oe 4 r V * Pn>teoebn
General Appearance) Ol Pret*er8*a

Veoanl (ov»x 6%)

350

45

8

Appeal to M l A > l

N o * : Race or t w rwid oompoefaon of • neighborhood om not eonetdered retabte epprateal aeotora.

COMMENTS A SINGLE FAMILY AREA IOCATED ABOUT 3 . 5 MILES NE OF HISTORIC PARK CITY MXST HOMES IN
IHE IMMEDIATE AREA ARE CUSTOM BUIUT. MANY HAVE BEEN BUIIiT IN THE PAST 2 YEARS. PARK CITY I S A"
YEAR ROUND RBCREATICaNAL AREA DEPENDENT UPON SKIING ANDTOURISMFCR ITS BOCNCMIC BASE. AS SUCH
REAL ESTATE VALUES FLUCTUATE GREATLY. INTOEPAST YEAR IHE RESALE MARKET HAS IMPROVED GREATLY
Topography
8 9 . 1 0 X 1 3 1 . 2 3 X 67 X 2 4 . 6 8 X 1 4 2 . 7 9
SLOPES DCrWN TO EAST
Sir*
<u»A*.
1 2 , 6 0 0 SQUARE FEET OR . 2 9 AC
com*Lot NO
TYCPICAL FCR AREA
8hepe
Zon^Ctea*teaton
R E S I D E N T I A L ,
S I N G L E
FAMILY
Zon*g Compl.no.
YES
RECTANGULAR
Ocatnage
HK3HE8T & BEST USE: Preaent U<*
YES
0*er U N
ND
AVERAGE
Pvbte

8 r r e IMPROVEMENTS

SM

Eteottfty

m

O M

Water

Corb/OulWf
BJdeweJt

Sanitary 8e-*er

8^tuow>

8torm Oe war

AJtey

Pubto

Type

ASFHALIT
CONCRETE
CONCRETE
INCANDESCENT
NONE

x

View

GOOD

Landaoapetg

GOOD
CONCRETE
TYPICAL UTIIJTY

Ottvewey
Apparent Eaeementa

x

XX

FEMA Ptood H e a r d
FEMA* Map/Zone

TYPC1AL BETCT GRQUNb U r i L r r t EASEMEN1S

COMMENTS (Apparent advert* aaeement*, encroachment*, special teeeeementa, aid* areee, eto):

DO NOT ADVERSEIEY AFFECT THE S I T E . NO SOIL OR SUB SOIL CONDITIONS ARE KNOWN TO EXIST I N THE"
AREA THAT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT IHE SITE OR EXISTING IMPROVEMENTS.
EXTERIOR DESCRIPTION

GENERAL DESCRIPTION
Una*

ONE

Foundation

Storte*

TTO

Extorter W a t t

TypepeVAS)
Oeetgn{8*»
E**ng
Propoeed
Under C o r f u o a o n
AgafYrt.)
E f f a c t v Aga (Yr« )

DETACHED
TVAD STORY
YES
IK)
NO
8 YEARS
8 YEARS

Foyar

ROOMS

Gutter* 4 Dwnapts.
WtaJbwTypa

VrOOD SASH

YES
YES
Manufacajrtd H o u w
TYPICAL
TYPE OONSTRUCITO
Storm 8 a a h

Slab
Crawl 8 p * o *

8ump Pump
Oampnoaa
SatOamant

6or»ao*

NO
_YES__
FULL
NONE
NO EVID
NO EVID
NO EVID

INSULATION

WUa

2,065
90
"PAINIED
PAINTED

Fteor

CARPET

Nona

lOutalda E n t y

TO EAST

A^ouacy

Ara* 8 a - r \
% FV«n»d
|C««ng

Roof

_^VE_

Ca«og

AVE

Waft*

AVE

Poor

WALKOUT TO EAST

"AVE"

Enargy ETBdant hama*

B C U L GLASS

D»+>g

LKV^g

BASEMENT

FOUNDATION

OCNCREIE
FRAME
CEDAR
FULL

Fmmty Rm

Laundry

2,065
1,640
4

FWarwd *ra« abov* grada oootair>a:
MaWnahvCcndWon

|HEAT1NG

CARPET/GOOD
PLSTRBRD/^AINT
T\OOD/GO0D
CARPET/TTLE
CERAMIC TILE
SatiW»i-aco<
VrOOO/AVER^ST
STAINED VAOOD TRIM
rV*p*aoa<i)

"IHFRTHASOMRV;

CAR STORAGE-

Oarvga

No Car*

C a/port

3

FWA

• ~>B*8»{t),

Badroom(«);

5,705sou W9

[KrTCHEN EQUIP

ATTIC

IMPROVEMENT ANALYSIS

FUMgemtar

None

Qualty of Corwruoabn
ConOhton of Irnpro'viTOenta

Fval

GAS

8teto

ICondWon

AVE

Drop Stair

Room 8toa*-l^yout

IAdequacy

AVE

Scuttle

Ctoeate end 8 b r * g *

Ftoor

Energy Eiflctenoy

NOME

Heated <

P^mbaig - Adequacy 4 Condtton

FWahed

EteottoaJ . Adequacy 4 ConcNon

COOUNQ
CenTtJ

WaanarTOryar

\Ormr

2

Adaquaqr

B

[OaUohad

AVE)
"AVE

Attached

NCNE

Mtorowvva)

Faal ol Oroaa LNtng Am a
Avg

fX
X
X

IX]
X

K W a n Cabinet* - Adequacy 4 Conxttlon

InWroom

CompeOMty to Ne<c#*orhood

Adaouala

Itouee Entry

Appeal 4 MartejtaMty

inadequate

Outeide E/tfry

Eeimated R e m a H n g Economkj L a *

X
40 YEARS
Yrfc
"45"YEAR5~Yr.

C«^cn AVET~ N o n a
Baaemem Entry
EJactVj Door
[Butt In
E*»nated RerrtaUng Phyetoaf Lite
A^«or-te.^re,
YARD 1S_ PARl'iALLY ^ ' y C i i | LANL^CAPR3 AND AU101J[nilNKIEUll). UUVEWD nun1
I S 8 X 2 4 . VrOOO D D d T I S ~ 4 0 ~ X 1 0 PLUS' 14 X 24".

"OVERALL IMPAIR AND O0NDlTTHI"lS"

DennKte9on (Phyaicsl, iuncfloneJ and attemai kvdaquactet. rapak^ na-eded. rnodamiration, eta)

REFLDCTIVE OF A IO<E OF 8 YEARS EFFECTIVE AGE

UPGEADES7~lMm]X~M^^
GanereJ markal condtrtone and p>*v«tence a n d kiipact \r* aubteclAnaffcet *r*t

HOME

wfts^jsraraunirimTr^

r»g*rdk>g l o a n dbwounts. tntereat buydowna and o o n c e r a b n a

EXISTING HCMES I N THE AREA HAS BEEN GOOD.

KJIOI

RESAUT0F

I N THE PAST 1 2 MONTHS IHE OVERALL MAnKET"TOrTlCM!S"

T!g"707EA~n5~lO-IES"]IAVE"BEEN"'DFFT,KiM) l-OTTSAIETmHT^rSQID DURING"I9927"AVE'PRICE"$2957209:"
»fek*»

Uma Form 7 0 1 0 S 6

T O T A L ' apprttaal toftwwt

by a U a*o6m. kv

I (900) 328 C&23

Fannte M a * I0CK

ia«C

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
(0899)
Attorney
for
Defendant
of and
for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL,

P.C.

525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0008
Telephone: [801] 532-2666
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FINANCIAL

LOWELL GERBER,

DECLARATION

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 924905415
vs.
Date:

August 10, 1994

MARY JO GERBER,
Defendant,
—oooOooo
Husband:
Addre s s:

Lowell Gerber

Soc. Sec. No.
Occupation: __
Employer:
Birth Date:

350-40-2033

Wife: Marv Jo Gerber
Address:
3 02 8 Meadows Drive
Park Citv, Utah 84060
Soc. Sec. No.
529-72-9417
Occupation:
Substitute teacher
Employer: Park Citv School Dist.
Birth DateB:

7/6/51

NOTE:
THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK
5 DAYS PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL
HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO
COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS- FORM AS REQUIRED WILL AUTHORIZE THE
COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS
DECISION.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE
PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.

STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES,

ASSETS

AND

LIABILITIES

(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4 .3; If figures are on a biweekly basis, multiply by 2.167)
HUSBAND

WIFE

GROSS MONTHLY INCOME FROM:

Salary and wages, including commissions,
bonuses, allowances and over-time,
payable: $1,466.46/6mnts
(pay period)
Pensions and retirement:
Social Security:
Disability and unemployment insurance:
Public Assistance
(welfare, AFDC payments, etc.):
Child support
Dividends and interest:
Rents:
All other sources (specify)
(alimony)

244.41

2,100.00
4,000.00

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME:
ITEMIZE
MONTHLY
INCOME:

DEDUCTIONS

FROM GROSS

State and federal income taxes:
(State, $2,400/vr. Federal, $4,800/vr
Number of exemptions taken:
Social Security:
Medical or other insurance
fully):
Union or other dues:
Retirement or pension funds:

6,344.41

600.00
4

(describe

Savinas Plan:
Credit Union:
Other (specify): On aross pay of
$1,466.46 Fed.. Tax = $3i.80;: State
$880; FICA $112.18, over 6 months =
$20 .79 .
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS:
NET MONTHLY INCOME - TAKE HOME PAY:
- 2 -

A -i*)

20.79
620.79
5,723.62

4.

DEBTS AND

OBLIGATIONS:

Creditor's Name
G.E. Capital

For
1st Mortgage

Date
Payable

Balance

10th Month

$198,628

Monthly
Payment
Sl.735)PIT)

$1,735.00

TOTAL:

ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES know to me owned individually
or
jointly
(indicated
who holds
or how title
held:
(H) Husband,
(W)
Wife,
or (J) Jointly).
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT
FOR COMPLETE
INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE.

VALUE

(a)

Household furnishings, furniture,
appliances, and equipment:

(b)

Automobile (Year-Make)

(c)

Securities - stocks, bonds:

(d)

Cash and deposit accounts (banks,
savings & loans, credit unions savings & checking:

(e)

Life Insurance

Name of Company

Policy
No.

Face Amt.

OWED
THEREON

Cash Value, accumulated
dividend, or loan amt.

None

(f)

Value of Interest and Amount
Presently Vested

Profit Sharing or
Retirement Accounts

Name :
Name:
- 3

fi-1*

(g)

Other Personal Property and Assets (Specify)
Bear Lake Lot = $10,000.00

(h)

Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned,
attach sheet with identical information for all additional
property):

Address:

Type of Property:
Date of Acquisition:

Original Cost:
$
Cost of Additions: $
Total Cost:
$
Mtg, Balance:
$
Other Liens:
$
Equity:
$
Monthly Amortization $
Taxes: $
Individual Contributions:

Total Present Value: $.
Basis for Valuation:

(i)

And to Whom:

Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business,
value less indebtedness):
- "None

(j)

Other Assets (Specify):
None

- 4 -

6.

TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES: *(Specify which party is the custodial
parent and list names and relationship of all members of the
household whose expenses are included)

Rent or Mortgage Payments (residence)
(PIT)
Real property taxes (residence)
Real property insurance (residence)
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies
Utilities inc. water, electricity, gas & heat
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning
Clothing
(Def. and 3 children)
Medical
(Def. and 3 children-uninsured portion)
Dental
Insurance ( Health ins, premium Plaintiff and 3
children)
School(Jewish Religious lessons for 3 minor
children = $l,000/vr)
Entertainment
(eat out, allowances, movies, video
rentals, books and any and all misc. expenses for
Defendant and 3 minor children)
Incidentals
(swim meets. Boy Scout camps.
travel and other activities for 3 minor children)
Grooming, gifts (X-mas & Birthdays, donations,
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance, taxes,
and registration)
Other expenses
Income taxes
Professional Fees (Board exams & trying
to find employment.
Veterinary expenses ($262/yr)
Accounting and Legal Fees
Computer repairs, supplies, updating
TOTAL EXPENSES:

1,735.00
-0-0150.00
900.00
239.00
60.00
20.00
225.00
50.00
-0186.00*
85.00
470.00
450.00
125.00
300.00
<600.00>
100.00
22.00
600.00
200.00
5,817.00

*Premium for 3 children = $90.00/month Plaintiff was ordered to
pay. He has not paid (10 x $90 = $900).

5

A-"*n

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF PENDING
DIVORCE
LITIGATION

Child Support $ 2,100.00

Total (per month) $ 2,100 . 00

Alimony $ 4 , 000.00

Total (per month) $ 4,000.00

Property Distribution:
1. In the Decree of Divorce entered November, 1993, Defendant was awarded
$4,000/month alimony based on the financial circumstances of the parties.
This was to be reviewed in 12 months, i.e., November, 1994 or earlier if
circumstances warranted such a review.
Defendant was to use her best
efforts to seek and obtain employment.
Defendant suffered damage in
February, 1993 to her right thumb and it is anticipated that she will not
be able to resume her career as a dental hygienist. Defendant took her
dental hygiene board examinations in June of 1994 for her licensing but
failed to pass due to her inability to properly "fee" on the scaling
of teeth. Defendant has lost sensitivity and dexterity in her thumb and
it is unlikely to improve beyond her present capabilities even after more
than a full year of physical therapy. Defendant has been doing substitute
teaching in the Park City School District and is paid $40.00/day.
2. Plaintiff claims that he is unable to continue to pay alimony in the
amount of $4,000.00 since he is now required to pay $800.00 per month in
disability premiums and he did not anticipate that the cost of housing in
Florida would be as high as he is now paying.
Plaintiff's salary,
however, still remains at $200,000.00 per year, the same rate he was
receiving when he was ordered to pay $4,000/month alimony.
3. Defendant will be unable to resume employment as a dental hygienist
because of the injury to her hand. Defendant is seeking to increase the
number of days of substitute teaching until she can obtain a "full time"
teaching position and therefore alimony should continue until Defendant
has obtained such a position.
4. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's attorney's fees of
$2,83 9.28 (approx.) incurred in having to respond to his Petition to
Modify.
GRAND TOTAL

PER

MONTH:

I, MARY JO GERBER, propose the above settlement

m

MARY Jp
- 6 -

.BER

If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately
hours and

^?

3

witnesses will be called for this party.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss.
)

I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

7

day of /y/taxof.
f

1994.

NOTAJ^ PUBLIC

Residing a t :
1

-"~—

NOTARY PUBLIC

, ,.

, ,

J&£CC&Z/Ct

* ,

^ ^

,,,-.

£ ^ C

'

Mary A. O'Donnell
1087 E. Country Woods Cir tA
Midvgle, Utah 84047

My Commission Expires
July 10, 1996
S T A T E O F UTAH

BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL
HEARING - ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS
DECLARATION,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST
RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS,
PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS, CERTIFICATES,
POLICIES AND OTHER
RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.
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CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or empoloyed in the law firm
of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. , 525 East First South, Suite* 500, P.O.
Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah

84147-0008, and that in said capacity, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINANCIAL DECLARATION to
be mailed to the person(s) named below:
B. L. Dart, Esq.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main, Ste. 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff
on this

•pf

I *~ day of

(mb\dsd\Gerber
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, 1994.
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